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USE OF ENERGY-EFFICIENT TECHNOLOGIES:  






Identifying effective methods for influencing Marines to accept energy-efficient 
technologies is vital to achieving a positive and sustainable energy outlook for the United 
States Marine Corps (USMC). The purpose of this study is to support the adoption of 
energy-efficient technologies by the USMC to increase Marine combat effectiveness. 
Toward this end, Marines’ concerns, awareness, and enthusiasm regarding energy-
efficient technologies were explored, as well as the influencers on these factors. This 
study and final recommendations are based on an analysis of focus group data from two 
focus groups held at the Naval Postgraduate School and two at Camp Pendleton. This 
analysis revealed key influence drivers and suggested potential influence strategies that 
the Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office can implement to help foster its 
initiatives.  
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Monetary issues and loss of life are key concerns driving an effort by the United 
States Marine Corps (USMC) to decrease energy use. A study conducted by the United 
States Army in 2007 examined the link between casualties and energy and found that one 
out of every 24 fuel convoys in Afghanistan, and one out of every 38 in Iraq, led to a 
military fatality (Humes, 2011). In 2011, Edward Humes (2011) noted that “the 
Department of Defense uses more petroleum (and energy) than any other organization on 
the planet—$13 billion to $18 billion worth a year, depending who does the math. That 
accounts for more than 80% of the federal government’s energy tab” (p. 1). As a result, 
the U.S. military, including the Marine Corps, is seeking to increase energy efficiency 
and embrace alternative energy. General James F. Amos, the commandant of the Marine 
Corps, stated, “Transforming the way we use energy is essential to rebalance our Corps 
and prepare it for the future” (Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office, n.d., para. 1). 
To prepare for this transformation, the Marine Corps created the Expeditionary Energy 
Office (E2O) to combat these concerns. The E2O seeks to change the way the Marine 
Corps employs energy and resources to increase combat effectiveness. 
The E2O’s mission is to “analyze, develop, and direct the Marine Corps’ energy 
strategy in order to optimize expeditionary capabilities across all War fighting functions” 
(Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office Headquarters, 2011, p. 5). The E2O was 
directed to “develop a plan to decrease the Marine Corps’ dependence on fossil fuel in a 
deployed environment” (p. 5). The E2O has determined that energy is a critical combat 
enabler and growing vulnerability. The adoption and employment of energy-efficient 
technologies within an expeditionary environment will facilitate a lighter and faster force 
whose self-reliance will foster combat effectiveness (Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy 
Office Headquarters, 2011). 
The development and use of energy-efficient technologies by the E2O is a key 
part of making the USMC more effective and efficient and can potentially reduce the 
number of casualties. To date, the USMC has created the E2O and published the USMC 
Expeditionary Energy Strategy and Implementation Plan with the goal of increasing 
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combat effectiveness through greater energy efficiency and the use of energy-efficient 
technologies. Technologies developed by the E2O, such as the Ground Renewable 
Expeditionary Energy Network System (GREENS), and the Solar Portable Alterative 
Communications Energy System (SPACES), have the potential to decrease dependency 
on fossil fuels by using sustainable sources of energy, such as harnessing the power of the 
sun and wind to generate energy. However, these technologies can provide benefits only 
if widely adopted and used, which will likely require increased awareness and a change 
in ethos (Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office Headquarters, 2011). 
E2O strategy statements acknowledge this concern.  
Achieving success will require no less than institutional change. … 
Finally, and most critically, we must change the way we think about 
energy—our warrior ethos must equate the efficient use of energy and 
water resources with increased combat effectiveness. (Marine Corps 
Expeditionary Energy Office Headquarters, 2011, p. 17)  
An MBA study currently in progress finds that Marines are largely unaware of E2O 
technologies (Ciarcia, 2013), which suggests both a challenge and an opportunity. A 
persistent lack of awareness would likely slow the adoption of energy-efficient 
technologies. However, because Marines have not yet formed opinions about energy-
efficient technology, the E2O has the opportunity to influence Marines’ perceptions and 
adoption decisions positively. 
The academic literature suggests opinion makers, communications methods, 
perceptions of both the problem and the solution, and individual characteristics, influence 
the adoption of new technologies. Therefore, to help the E2O, it is necessary to know the 
answers to the following questions.  
• Who and what are key opinion makers?  
• Through which communication channels is information about 
technologies communicated?  
• What are Marines’ perceptions of energy-efficient technologies? (to include 
perceptions of the problem the technology may solve and of the solution the 
technology may provide)  
• How do a Marine’s individual characteristics influence the adoption 
decision?  
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The primary purpose of this study is to analyze the adoption of new energy-efficient 
technologies by the USMC intended to increase Marine combat effectiveness. Toward 
that end, focus group data are collected and analyzed. Marines’ perceptions and attitudes 
regarding energy-efficient technologies are first identified. Second, key influence drivers 
of these perceptions and attitudes are also identified and recommendations made to 
support the adoption of energy-efficient technologies by Marines. 
A. PURPOSE/RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to support the adoption of energy-efficient 
technologies by the USMC to increase Marine combat effectiveness. Toward this end, 
Marines’ concerns, awareness, and enthusiasm regarding energy-efficient technologies 
were explored, as well as the influencers on these factors. This study and final 
recommendations are based on an analysis of focus group data from two focus groups 
held at the Naval Postgraduate School and two at Camp Pendleton. This analysis revealed 
key influence drivers and suggested potential influence strategies.  
The following are the primary and secondary research questions.  
• Primary question 
• What are the drivers that lead Marines to accept and adopt energy-
efficient technologies? 
• Secondary questions  
• Who are the opinion makers who influence Marines opinions 
regarding new tools/technologies? 
• What communication channels have influenced Marines’ 
perceptions of new tools/technologies in the past? 
• What are Marines’ perceptions of energy-efficient 
tools/technologies? 
• How do Marines perceive the problems posed by dependence on 
fossil fuels?  
• How do these drivers differentially influence different types of 
decision makers (end use, squad leader, platoon leader, company 
commander)? 
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B. RESEARCH APPROACH  
Why individuals adopt or resist technologies is a central question in technology 
management and energy conservation research (Arkesteijn & Oerlemans, 2005; Darley & 
Beniger, 1981; Kleijnen, Lee, & Wetzels, 2009; Rogers, 1995). The media, 
communication patterns, and peer influence have been shown to influence people in 
organizations (Watkins, 2003). This study was designed to explore Marines’ attitudes and 
perceptions of energy-efficient technology and to identify key influencers of these 
attitudes and perceptions. A focus group methodology was selected because it provides 
the opportunity to watch opinion formulation in action (Barber, 2007). This method is 
particularly useful when participants are unaware of the topics. Barber (2007) stated that 
focus groups “emphasize the significance of a comparative focus with the ultimate aim of 
enhancing analytical sophistication” (p. 145).  
A theoretical framework was developed that guided the data collection and 
analysis. The framework focuses attention on five key drivers of the acceptance of 
technologies. Acceptance is defined as the decision to adopt or support the technology. 
These drivers are opinion makers, communication method, individual perceptions of the 
problem, individual perception of the solution, and characteristics of the decision maker. 
This framework draws largely from Watkins’ (2003) model for organizational influence 
campaigns. Watkins’ model to focus on individual, rather than organizational, factors and 
technology adoption were adapted. The researchers drew from Rogers’ (1995) ideas on 
the role of communication channels in the diffusion of technology, research on the role of 
individual perception in technology adoption, (Arkesteijn & Oerlemans, 2005; Kleijnen 
et al., 2009), and research on the role of characteristics of the end user in technology 
adoption and diffusion (Arkesteijn & Oerlemans, 2005; Rogers, 1995). Based on this 
research, Watkins’ model was adapted to develop the guiding theoretical framework for 
this study, depicted in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.  Influence Campaigns (from Watkins, 2003) 
A very broad understanding of Watkins’ concept of opinion makers was adopted. 
Watkins (2003) defined opinion makers as those who “provide data and analysis that 
shape the opinion [of the decision makers]” (p. 11). The researchers sought to identify 
key influences, including but not limited to people, on Marines’ enthusiasm for or 
resistance to energy-efficient technologies.  
Communication method is defined as the way in which information flows to the 
end user of a technology. Rogers (1995) argued that communication channels create 
knowledge, spread information, and are important to adoption decisions because that 
knowledge and creation affect the end user’s decision. Many methods of communication 
are now available to organizations. The researchers sought to identify which 
communication methods are most likely to link opinion makers to Marines’ perceptions 
and acceptance of energy-efficient technologies. 
The academic literature (Arkesteijn & Oerlemans, 2005; Kleijnen et al., 2009) 
suggests that perception is a key driver of technology acceptance. Perception of the 
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problem is defined as individuals’ perceptions of the magnitude and severity of the 
problem a given technology might address (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). In the case of the 
USMC and energy-efficient technologies, interest is focused upon to what degree and 
why Marines view dependency on fossil fuels as problematic. Similarly, drawing from 
Kaplan and Tripsas (2008), perception of the solution is defined as Marines’ 
understanding of how and to what extent a particular technology will address a particular 
problem. 
Finally, many studies suggest that individual characteristics are likely to influence 
the acceptance of technologies (Arkesteijn & Oerlemans, 2005; Rogers, 1995). 
Functional expertise (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Orlikowski & Gash, 1994) and level in an 
organization (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008) have been shown to influence the acceptance of 
technologies. Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and rank are focused upon in 
particular. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II presents a review of the literature on the academic topics used to 
compose the theoretical framework that guides this research. Chapter III explains the 
methods used for this study. Chapter IV details this study’s analysis and findings. 
Chapter V discusses pertinent discoveries and implications, and gives recommendations 
to address those discoveries. Chapter VI offers final thoughts on the research and 
recommendations for the best communication methods and opinion makers to use for the 
successful adoption of energy-efficient technologies.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter identifies and describes the theories and concepts, which developed 
the framework that guided this study. Studies of influence and communication with 
research on technology adoption were integrated to develop the framework and guide the 
exploration of the following questions.  
• Who are the opinion makers influencing Marines’ opinions regarding new 
tools/technologies? 
• What communication channels have influenced Marines’ perceptions of 
new tools/technologies in the past? 
• What are Marines’ perceptions of energy-efficient tools/technologies? 
• How do Marines perceive the problems posed by dependence on fossil 
fuels?  
• How do these drivers differentially influence different types of decision 
makers (end user, squad leader, platoon leader, company commander)? 
Research on technology adoption and diffusion seeks to explain why individuals 
accept and use technologies, and how technologies and innovations diffuse across 
populations. Various researchers draw on planned behavioral theories to answer these 
questions. This study focuses on three key theories: Diffusion of Innovation (DoI) 
(Rogers, 1995), Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989), and Technology 
Resistance (Kleijnen, Lee, & Wetzels, 2009). 
B. ROGERS’ DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (DOI) MODEL 
Rogers’ (1995) DoI model identified the significant elements in technological 
change. This model illustrates how rates of adoption are influenced by key factors within 
an innovation-decision process occurring over communication channels. His DoI model 
primarily considers influences, ideas, behaviors, and communication within a social 
context, but does not provide enough focus on individual adoption. Ellsworth (2000) 
described innovation attributes as the most critical benefits of Rogers’ DoI model writing, 
“Practitioners are likely to find this perspective of the greatest use if they are engaged in 
the actual development of the innovation or if they are deciding whether (or how) to 
 8 
adapt the innovation to meet local requirements…Rogers’ framework can be useful in 
determining how it [the innovation] is to be presented to its intended adopters” (p. 40). 
The DoI model identifies and explains factors that influence the decision process 
of whether to adopt or reject an innovation. Developed by Everett Rogers in 1962, the 
DoI model illustrates how innovations diffuse through populations or social networks. An 
innovation is defined as an idea, practice, technology, or perceived as new. Rogers 
studied diffusion from a communication framework by analyzing how communication 
processes in social networks influence the rate of innovation adoption. The DoI model 
presents a five-stage innovation-decision process, including characteristics of individuals, 
opinion makers, social norms, and ideas and behaviors that influence decisions at each 
stage, and ultimately impact, the adoption or rejection of an innovation. Rogers’ model is 
depicted in Figure 2 and explained below. 
Rogers (1995) defines diffusion as a process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system 
or network. According to Rogers (1995): (1) potential adopters can be individuals, 
groups, or organizations at different levels of any social system; 2) the target of diffusion 
is innovation; 3) the process through which diffusion occurs is communication; 4) the 
means is communication channels; 5) the context of innovation is a social system; and 6) 
diffusion occurs through change over time.  
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Figure 2.  Innovation-decision process (from Rogers, 1995) 
1. Innovation-decision Process 
The innovation decision-making process, comprised of five identifiable stages, 
moves from a change in knowledge to a change in behavior. The five identifiable stages 
include knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation. Knowledge 
occurs when a potential adopter is exposed to the innovation’s existence and gains 
awareness on how it works. Persuasion arises when a potential adopter forms an attitude, 
either positive or negative, toward the innovation. Decision arises when a potential 
adopter engages in activities, which determine whether to adopt or reject the innovation. 
Implementation occurs when a potential adopter uses an innovation. Confirmation occurs 
when potential adopters seeks reinforcement of the decision to use the innovation or, 
because of conflict, reverse their previous decision. Darley and Beniger (1981) argue 
confirmation of an adoption decision can be done through social networks. 
2. Opinion Makers (Rate of Adoption) 
Rogers identified five factors that influence the rate of adoption that include the 
nature of the social system or network, communication channels, perceived attributes of 
innovation, the type of innovation-decision, and the extent of a change agent’s promotion 
efforts. The first factor that influences the rate of adoption is the nature of the social 
network. A social network is defined as a set of interrelated units (such as the non-
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commissioned officers of a platoon, the tenured professors of a college, or all the 
members of a political party) engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish a common 
goal. The social framework, patterned arrangements of the units in a system, affects the 
way diffusion occurs within a social network. A social network encompasses system 
norms, roles of opinion makers and change agents, types of innovation decisions, and the 
consequences of innovation. System or network norms are established behavior patterns 
for the members of a social network. Roles of opinion makers and change agents affect 
the degree to which an individual is able to influence other individuals’ attitudes 
informally in a desired way. Types of innovation-decisions, as described in greater detail 
below, include optional innovation-decision, collective innovation-decision, and authority 
innovation-decision. The consequence of innovation accounts for desirable versus 
undesirable (whether the effects of the innovation become functional or dysfunctional 
within the social system), direct versus indirect (if changes to the social system are 
immediate or the result of a second order effect to a different innovation), and anticipated 
versus unanticipated (changes were recognized and intended versus unintended).  
3. Communication Methods (Channels) 
Communication channels are the second factor that influences the rate of 
adoption. Communication is “the process by which participants create and share 
information with one another in order to reach a mutual understanding” (Rogers, 1995, p 
17). Messages flow from one individual to another through communication channels. 
Two types of communication channels are mass media and interpersonal (Rogers, 1995). 
Mass media channels include mediums, such as the Internet, television, and radio, which 
expedite the action of a few individuals to reach a wider audience. Mass media facilitates 
reaching big audiences rapidly to create knowledge, spread information, and lead to 
changes in weak attitudes. Interpersonal channels involve face-to-face exchanges 
between two or more people, which enable individuals to seek clarity and to create 
environments to form or change strongly held attitudes. Subsequently, interpersonal 




where mass media channels are more essential at the knowledge stage of the innovation-
decision process. Diffusion, therefore, is a specific type of communication, which occurs 
to exchange a new idea with one or several others (Rogers, 1983). 
Another factor that influences the rate of adoption is the extent of the change 
agent’s promotion efforts (Rogers, 1995; Darley & Beniger, 1981). Change agents are 
people who introduce innovations into a society (workplace) that they expect will have 
desirable, direct, and anticipated consequences. Change agents achieve results through 
facilitating groups of people through a systematic process to develop, organize, and to 
sell new ideas (Ellsworth, 2000). They are the invisible hands that turn vision into action. 
To be successful, change agents require the knowledge, skills, and tools to implement 
change in the workplace or society. Rogers’ DoI model provides guidelines for change 
agents concerning what attributes can be incorporated into the innovation to facilitate 
acceptance by the intended adopter. 
C. TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
The technology acceptance model (TAM) recognizes and explains the 
components that influence information technology acceptance to predict the acceptance 
and use of information technology and information systems by individuals. Developed by 
Fred Davis in 1989, the TAM is considered one of the most influential research models 
on technology acceptance and has received prominent attention by researchers over the 
past years (Chen, Li, & Li, 2011). The unique feature of the TAM is how it provides the 
foundation for tracing the impact of the external factors on internal beliefs, attitudes, and 
intentions. The TAM achieved this end by identifying a handful of basic variables 
suggested by previous research dealing with cognitive (awareness and understanding) and 
affective (attitude and perception) factors of computer acceptance using Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA) for modeling the theoretical relationships among these variables 
(Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989). According to the TAM, technology acceptance is a 
function of a potential user’s perceptions of a technology’s usefulness and ease of use as 
shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Technology Acceptance Model (from Davis, 1989) 
1. Perception of the Solution (Perceived Usefulness and Perceived Ease 
of Use) 
Perceived usefulness represents how people will or will not use an innovation to 
the extent they believe it will help them in doing their jobs better. Davis (1989) defines 
perceived usefulness as “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular 
system would enhance his or her job performance” (p. 320). Perceived ease of use 
considers while someone may think the technology is beneficial, it is still believed to be 
too difficult to use and the advantages of employing it are outweighed by the effort 
required to use it. Davis (1989) describes perceived ease of use as “the degree to which a 
person believes that using a particular system would be free from effort” (p. 320). 
2. From Perceptions to Adoption 
Research by Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw (1989) shows that use is predicted 
from intentions; perceived usefulness is a chief determinant of intention to use; and 
perceived ease of use is a noteworthy secondary determinant of intention to use. 
Interestingly, ease of use appeared to be processed from a self-efficacy perspective; as 
people learned to use a new technology, the perceived ease of use became less important. 
The findings of the study supported the fact that although ease of use is important, users 
will accept a lower level of perceived ease of use to benefit from a higher level of 
perceived usefulness. Overall, the study found that the use of well-informed measures of 
determinants (perceived ease of use and usefulness) in calculating innovation use would 
reduce the risk associated with innovations being delivered for implementation and not 
used (Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989). 
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3. Adoption of Energy-efficient technologies 
Studies specific to the adoption of energy-efficient technologies have found that 
social networks and characteristics of the technologies and individuals influence 
adoption. This thesis presents three studies. 
Darley and Beniger (1981) study the diffusion of energy-conserving innovations 
in households. Specifically, they examine solar heating. They explored how individuals 
evaluate innovations and found that social networks are the strongest factor in the 
adoption of energy conserving innovations. Their study results in three key findings: 
First, the decision to adopt or reject any innovation is determined by interpersonal 
networks surrounding the potential adopter; mass media is less critical. Second, small 
fixes, such as insulation or a water flow restrictor in a household, can be viewed as an 
innovation. Third, free market operations will not alone achieve the level of conservation 
available to households (Darley & Beniger, 1981). 
Darley and Beniger (1981) state that adoption can simply be a process of 
communication or spread of information through space. The process flow starts with 
mass media to what Darley and Beniger (1981) call the “early adopter-elite.” The “early 
adopter-elite” can also be viewed as the opinion makers from an influence campaign. The 
elite adopts an innovation and communicates it throughout their personal network, which 
spurs diffusion in areas other than the center of diffusion. These second-order adopters 
are “imitators.” The last step in the process flow is diffusion through close proximity 
(Darley & Beniger, 1981). 
Darley and Beniger (1981) conclude that adoption occurs through personal 
networks first and then influencers outside personal networks occur at a second stage. 
Thus, rational calculations are not the only factors that influence technology adoption. 
Whom one knows and where the information comes from is also a strong factor. 
Furthermore, Darley and Beniger (1981) suggest putting change agents in place to 
counter whatever elements become barriers to innovation whether they are perceptions, 
complexity, or the environment. 
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Darley and Beniger (1981) draw on Rogers’ five dimensions of an innovation that 
determine the likelihood of its adoption: (1) relative advantage, (2) value compatibility, 
(3) complexity, (4) trialability, and (5) observability. Darley and Beniger (1981) examine 
how these dimensions impact California homeowners’ decisions to adopt solar hot-water 
heating. They find that three of Rogers’ dimensions had an impact: (1) economic and 
ecological considerations, (2) trialability, and (3) complexity (but lesser than the first 
two). Darley and Beniger (1981) argue that modifying and extending these three Rogers’ 
dimensions into the following psychological dimensions may provide a better explanation 
of the adoption of energy conserving innovations: (1) cost, (2) savings, (3) certainty of 
savings, (4) value, attitude, and style compatibility, (5) innovation and life-pattern 
interactions, (6) trialability, (7) dissatisfaction with existing situation or product, (8) 
effort and skill involved in installing innovation, and (9) role of social networks. This 
study focuses on characteristics of technologies including, trialability, complexity, and 
observability. 
The level of trialability effects the perception of the solution. It is the ability to 
test something before adoption. Darley and Beniger (1981) cite a general example of 
well-known marketing strategies: “free ten day trial, with refund-if-you-are-not-satisfied 
and they explain that it is important to gain the trust of the end user and also to instill 
confidence (p. 158). This study uses the trialability dimension and explores how it affects 
the perception of the solution in terms of Marines’ adopting energy-efficient technologies 
to use less fossil fuel. Trialability is important to this project’s model because the studies 
suggest it has a strong impact on how Marines will adopt a new technology. Watkins only 
introduces the fact that trialability is important and does delve into great detail about its 
effect. Complexity refers to how hard a technology or piece of equipment is to use, which 
is similar to TAM’s ease of use. In the case of solar hot water heating, potential users 
might consider, “Is it just as easy to use as a gas or electric hot water heater?” Another 
complexity issue could be “How hard is it to fix or maintain?” Darley and Beniger (1981) 
argue that the observability of the outcome of an innovation will determine the 
probability of others seeing it, and subsequently, adopting it. For example, if a 
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homeowner sees a neighbor’s solar panels outside, that homeowner may become 
interested in using them. Thus, seeing them increases the probability of adoption.  
4. Individual Characteristics 
Arkesteijn and Oerlemans (2005) conducted a study on the early adoption of 
green power in Dutch residential users. The research data were collected in June 2001, 
one month before the green electricity market was liberalized. The residential green 
market, however, consists of mainly early adopters that stem from one of the two 
developments: the liberalization that changed the structure of the energy market, and the 
energy policies of governments and environmental concerns that lead to focusing on 
sustainability. The study centered on factors that drive the need for green technology, and 
how those needs lead to early adoption or non-adoption in residential households. 
Arkesteijn and Oerlemans’ (2005) research focused specifically on the individual. 
Their theoretical models were strongly based on Fishbein and Ajzen (1975): the theory of 
reasoned action, and Rogers’ (1995) adoption model. They, however, expanded on them 
by emphasizing the cognitive aspects of early adoption or non-adoption through 
economic factors and trust. Trust becomes a mechanism for the individual/group that 
does not fully understand the technology/product (Arkesteijn & Oerlemans, 2005). 
The authors found that (1) a high level of perceived responsibility for the 
environment, as well as a high willingness to pay, increases the likelihood of adoption, 
and (2) people who had higher levels of the basic prior knowledge, which had to be 
acquired actively and showed environmental friendly behavior in the past, were more 
likely to adopt (Arkesteijn & Oerlemans, 2005). The lack of visibility (social and 
product) did not deter early adopters. Individuals who understand the use and background 
of sustainable energy, and feel they have a personal responsibility to make a positive 
environmental stance, have a higher tendency to become early adopters of green 
technology. The complete opposite is true for non-adopters.  
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D. RESISTANCE  
Kleijen, Lee and Wetzels’ (2009) resistance hierarchy, depicted in Figure 4, 
highlights different antecedents and their potential connection to one of three components 
of resistance: postponement, rejection, and opposition. Antecedents incorporate two main 
groups: (1) degree of change required, and (2) conflicts with prior belief structure, 
including physical risk, economical risk, functional risk, social risk, traditions and norms, 
perceived image, and usage patterns. Recent research examines how the combinations of 
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Figure 4.  Resistance Hierarchy (from Kleijnen, Lee, & Wetzels, 2009) 
1. Antecedents  
Four drivers identified influence resistance concerning the adoption of an 
innovation: risk, traditions and norms, perceived image, and usage patterns. Within the 
risk driver, four different types influence resistance: physical, economic, functional, and 
social. Physical risk focuses on the fear of physical danger that might occur by adopting 
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the new technology. Economic risk draws attention to the cost of the new technology and 
whether the benefits outweigh the risks. Functional risk involves uncertainty concerning 
the innovation. Does the new technology work as intended and, if not, what are the 
negative implications? Social risk involves the acceptance or rejection by the adopter’s 
social environment. Will the adopter be ostracized from his social system (Kleijnen, Lee, 
& Wetzels, 2009)? 
The three remaining drivers that influence resistance are traditions and norms, 
perceived image, and usage patterns. Traditions and norms address the schema of an 
individual. The more comparable the new technology is within the adopter’s patterns and 
habits, the more likely resistance will not occur (Herbig & Day, 1992). Perceived image 
focuses on the adopter’s associations given the circumstance of the new technology. If 
the new technology is associated with something with a bad reputation, the potential 
resistance is more likely (Ram & Sheth, 1989). Usage patterns are formed from habitual 
behavior of using a product repeatedly. If the new technology is harmonious with the 
adopter’s current patterns, it will most likely result in less resistance (Ram & Sheth, 
1989). 
2. Resistance 
Kleijnen, Lee, and Wetzels’ (2009) study found postponement to be similar to 
“delaying” connected economic risks and usage patterns as the main drivers. 
Postponement was defined as an innovation acceptable in theory, but adoption may not 
occur immediately. Rather, it may not occur until the circumstances are more appropriate 
for the adopter. Situational barriers that can be temporary in nature often drive end users 
to resist innovation until they feel its application is useful. Therefore, it could be 
beneficial to communicate how innovations fit within a person’s lifestyle and bundle 
innovations with products already part of someone’s usage patterns. Kleijnen, Lee, and 
Wetzels (2009) identified rejection as a considerable high reluctance to adopt. 




knowledge or inexperience, but rather from extensive evaluation. Other research by 
Hirschheim and Newman (1988) hypothesize that rejection is additionally linked with an 
averseness to change the status quo. 
Kleijnen, Lee, and Wetzels (2009) equate opposition to sabotage. Additional 
research describes innovation disruption as a strategy to stop an innovation in having 
adoption success (Davidson & Walley, 1985). This type of resistance occurs when the 
end user becomes convinced that the new technology is undesirable. Given these 
findings, it is reasonable to suggest that opposition seems to be driven by factors 
embedded in a person’s personal and societal environment. This concept is consistent 
with the discoveries that traditions and norms drive only this resistance type. It is 
extremely difficult to change a societal context; consequently, organizations should 
consider investigating the flexibility of the innovation, even after introduction (Ram & 
Seth, 1989). 
3. Strategic Implications of Resistance Hierarchy 
Research by Kleijnen, Lee, and Wetzels (2009) presented the collection of 
antecedents and definitions for the types of resistance. Postponement was agreed to be 
“an active decision to not adopt an innovation at that moment in time” (Kleijnen, Lee, & 
Wetzels, 2009, p. 352). Postponement, considered the weakest form of resistance, 
occurred when an innovation changed existing usage patterns and possessed economic 
risk. Rejection was referred to as “the active decision to not at all take up an innovation” 
(Kleijnen, Lee, & Wetzels, 2009, p. 352). Rejection occurred when innovation changing 
existing usage patterns and economic risk were combined with poor image and social and 
functional risk. Opposition was agreed upon to refer to “actual active behavior directed in 
some way towards opposing the introduction of an innovation” (Kleijnen, Lee, & 
Wetzels, 2009, p. 353). The strongest form of resistance, opposition, occurred when 
functional, social, and physical risks were combined with a conflict in existing traditions 
and a poor image.  
Strategic implications observed by Kleijnen, Lee, and Wetzels (2009) identify that 
as the number of risk dimensions increase, people more likely tend to outright reject 
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innovation, rather than postpone adoption. Although economic, functional, and social 
risks are important drivers of rejection, perceived image also plays an integral role. 
Image, in most cases, serves a signaling function to compensate for a lack of knowledge. 
Further evaluation and data generated through Kleijnen, Lee, and Wetzels’ (2009) 
focus groups highlighted the significance that antecedents are different in nature for each 
form of resistance. Individual and combinations of antecedents are linked to a particular 
resistance type in the resistance hierarchy provided in Figure 5. Overall, the study 
showed several combinations of antecedents lead to risk, but clearly demonstrated how 
perceived risk maintains the dominant role to innovation resistance. 
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Figure 5.  Resistance Hierarchy Links (from Kleijnen, Lee & Wetzels, 2009) 
From the results of focus groups, some interesting conclusions can be applied to 
drivers. Drivers differ from the various resistance forms, but some common 
interpretations can be utilized going forward. Risk plays an important role throughout the 
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various types of resistance. This observation suggests that reduction strategies will play 
an integral role in reducing resistance toward innovations. A common theme among 
researchers advocates the use of information to increase knowledge about risks and their 
solutions (Dowling & Staelin, 1994; Locander & Hermann, 1979). On the other hand, 
previous resistance research cautions against this method due to the discovery of 
information overload as an important stimulus to resistance (Herbig & Kramer, 1992). To 
overcome resistance, information should be tailored to the target audience’s concerns or 
issues. For example, “new media can be particularly helpful in providing demonstrations 
on how products work in virtual environments, illustrating how products can be 
incorporated in existing habits and current situations” (Kleijnen, Lee, & Wetzels, 2009, p. 
353). 
E.  COMMONALITIES IN THEORIES 
The aforementioned studies mentioned are grounded in behavioral theories. They 
suggest that communication channels and perceptions influence behavior. Other studies 
focus on influential factors, or what this study calls, the opinion makers in the 
framework. These studies suggest that certain people not only control the flow of 
information, but also shape opinions of potential users through their actions. Therefore, 
this study wants to understand better who sets the example for a Marine who will 
potentially use an energy-efficient technology. 
To understand communication and influence better, Watkins’ Influence Campaign 
is considered, which suggests that opinion makers, information, and internal, as well as 
external, perceptions, shape how and if an end user is positively influenced. This concept 
becomes the ultimate framework. 
F. WATKINS’ INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN 
The E2O seeks to find the most effective way to integrate energy-efficient 
technology into the USMC’s culture to increase combat effectiveness by decreasing 
energy consumption. To achieve this change in warfighters’ ethos, an exploration of the 
drivers that influence energy adoption behavior within the Marine Corps is mandatory. 
The question is “how can Marines be successfully influenced to use energy-efficient 
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technology?” Michael Watkins Influence Campaign has been chosen to help frame how 
to identify drivers of adoption. Watkins (2003) states, “Leaders conduct diplomacy when 
they seek to influence the behavior of outside parties in order to advance their 
institution’s strategies” (p. 1). The goal is to use Watkins’ Influence Campaign to help 
learn how the Marine leadership can impact the Marines’ decisions to adopt energy-
efficient technologies. Once what elements influence them are discerned, and to what 
degree, this study can recommend an adoption strategy. Watkins (2003) states that 
managers have four key areas for influence: negotiation, coalition building, advertising, 
and public relations. The influence campaign aims at shaping decision makers’ 
perceptions of their interests and choices in what Watkins calls the “chain of influence.” 
This chain connects decision makers to their superiors and opinion makers and contains 
the following. 
• Decision Makers—The people who will actually make the final decision. 
• Advisers—The individuals/groups that provide advice to decision makers 
affecting their perspective on the decision. 
• Influencers—The individuals, institutions, or coalitions external or 
internal to the decision-makers’ organization that influence their decision. 
• Key “publics”—The broader public that reaches the decision maker. 
• Opinion Makers—The institutions that provide the data and analysis that 
shape the opinions of the key public. 
The goal is to find the influence environment through audience, media outlets, 
technology framing, and how they are all integrated into adoption. These new drivers 
better fit the USMC transition in “ethos.” Watkins’ model states: 
Effective corporate diplomacy informs the development of company 
strategy and plays a critical role in its successful realization. Managers 
must be able to diagnose key external interdependencies, identify the most 
important influence games their companies need to play, define objectives, 
and identify the key targets of influence. With this diagnosis in hand, they 
are well equipped to design integrated influence campaigns and to craft 
supporting process plans. (Watkins, 2003, p. 16) 
Watkins’ model in its original form is better for technology diffusion. Conversely, 
this project focuses on the individual adoption of an energy-efficient technology. 
Watkins’ model does not provide key factors to help identify the role of individual 
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adoption, which is the reason behind this study’s modifications. Using additional 
literature, gaps in Watkins’ model are filled. For example, Arkesteijn and Oerlemans’ 
(2005) study focuses specifically on the individual, which does tailor to this study for the 
adoption of energy-efficient technologies in Marines, as opposed to Watkins who mainly 
focuses on an organization. Watkins’ model is a good starting point because the 
researchers are interested in how to identify the drivers that lead a Marine to adopt a 
technology. This new influence campaign is illustrated in Figure 6. The remainder of this 
literature review is devoted to several literature articles that focus on elements and sub-
elements in the influence campaign that build on concepts and theories to address this 
study’s research questions. 
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Figure 6.  Research Framework (after Watkins, 2003) 
This study adapted Watkins’ influence campaign and modified the processes to fit 
better the influence flow of a Marine adopting an energy-efficient technology. The results 
were new categories based on articles that discuss the factors of technology adoption.  
• Communications method—More effective than Watkins’ key publics 
because of the desire to explore how ideas are communicated to Marines. 
Everett Rogers analyzed how the communication processes influences the 
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rate of innovation adoption. He found that communication creates 
knowledge and spreads information and the researchers want to expand on 
this concept in context within the Marine Corps. Additionally, with Darley 
and Beniger’s (1981) article, the importance of communication methods 
are introduced and emphasized. 
• Perception of solution—More effective than Watkins’ internal advisors 
because the influence campaign is from the perspective of an individual 
Marine and not an organization. Marines come from various backgrounds 
that shape their methods of problem solving. Darley and Beniger’s (1981) 
article, as well as Rogers’ (1995) and the TAM, suggest that perceptions 
shape how and if someone adopts a technology. Additionally, to combat 
negative perceptions, risk reduction strategies discovered by Kleijnen, 
Lee, and Wetzels (2009), along with effective communication methods, 
are vital. 
• Perception of problem—More effective than Watkins’ external influencers 
because influencers were incorporated in both perception of the solution 
and perception of the problem. Again, external influencers fit better from a 
corporate framework. Darley and Beniger (1981), Rogers (1995), and the 
TAM suggest that external perceptions are very important factors to 
explore. In addition, the resistance research and data gather by Kleijnen, 
Lee, and Wetzels (2009) provide a foundation of knowledge and baseline 
concerning the perception of the problem within our influence campaign. 
Based on the adoption of energy conserving technology literature, this study has 
identified initial sub-categories for each oval in the influence campaign figure. For 
opinion makers, the data suggest that the chain of command, Research Development Test 
& Evaluation (RDT&E), and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) (Special Forces), 
will be the major people and experiences that shape a Marine’s opinion of a certain 
technology. Based on communication literature, social media, observability, product 
effectiveness, demonstration, word of mouth, and newsletters, will be the major methods 
of communication. Based on influence literature, environment will impact a Marine’s 
perception of the problem and technology characteristics, complexity, trialability, and 
observability, will impact the perception of the solution. Therefore, focus group questions 
have been formulated to explore these sub-categories and any others that might exist. 
G. STUDY FRAMEWORK 
The resistance hierarchy provided the ability to identify antecedents to resistance, 
and suggested that risk reduction strategies, along with effective communication 
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methods, were vital to combat negative perceptions. The TAM identified how individual 
factors that influence information technology acceptance could predict acceptance and 
use of information technology by individuals through emphasizing valuable determinates 
concerning the perception of the problem and opinion makers. Darley and Beniger’s 
(1981) theories identified the relevance of communication methods and the perception of 
the solution. Arkesteijn and Oerlemans’ (2005) theories explained the importance of the 
perception of the solution and the problem. All the various models and theories afforded 
an explanation into the importance of the elements and sub-elements of Watkins’ 
Influence Campaign. Together, the theories provided a framework that guided this study.  
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III.  METHODS 
A.  RESEARCH APPROACH/INTRODUCTION 
The primary data for this study resulted from focus group discussions. Focus 
groups are appropriate for this study’s purposes since they allow insight into Marines’ 
concerns and awareness of energy-efficient technologies. This approach provided the 
opportunity to observe the collective insight of individuals with regard to the primary and 
secondary questions. The data were analyzed through qualitative trend and thematic 
analysis.  
The focus group questions were designed to elicit discussions among Marines on 
the topic of energy efficiency outside and inside their professional environment. 
Additionally, the focus group was designed to explore how cognitive factors (awareness 
and understanding) and affective factors (attitude and perception) affect USMC’s 
decisions concerning willingness to adopt or resist energy-efficient technologies. The 
focus group protocol was reviewed and approved by the Department of the Navy (DoN) 
Internal Review Board (IRB), USMC IRB, and selected Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) professors. 
After consenting to participate, Marines were introduced to the focus group 
objective: 
Our MBA project will identify Marines’ concerns, awareness, and 
enthusiasm to adopt energy-efficient technologies. Energy-efficient 
technologies have the potential to significantly reduce fossil fuel 
dependency for forward-deployed and home-stationed personnel and are 
hoped to increase combat effectiveness. 
Following the consent, the focus group consisted of four leading questions, 
various probing questions, and multiple activities that can be found in Appendix A. 
B.  DATA SOURCES 
Four focus groups were conducted. An all-hands email was sent to Marine Corps 
Officers currently stationed at NPS asking them to voluntarily participate in two focus 
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groups sponsored by the E2O. In addition, assistance was requested from the E2O to 
conduct focus groups in Camp Pendleton. The E2O worked with the director of Science 
and Technology to craft a formal message from the E2O to the First Marine 
Expeditionary Forces (IMEF) requesting voluntary focus groups. In the beginning of the 
focus groups, a demographic survey (included in Appendix B) requested individual 
demographic information including age, rank, highest education attained, number of 






Figure 7.  Focus Group Participant Demographic Breakdown 
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Ten minutes were allotted before any formal discussion started to allow the 
Marines to talk and mingle. The moderator began with an introduction and welcome to 
include an explanation of the objectives and purpose followed by the leading and probing 
questions (Appendix A). Four 60- to 90-minute sessions were conducted and digitally 
recorded (voice only) with the Marines’ main ideas written on a whiteboard. The digital 
recordings were transcribed, which resulted in 161 pages of text. 
C. ANALYSIS APPROACH 
Inductive and abductive approaches were utilized, which involved a series of 
meaning condensation and categorization. Initially, the pictures of the whiteboard were 
examined with a rough categorization made of how the primary and secondary questions 
were answered and how the five drivers were completed. Data from the focus group were 
used to investigate specific occurrences of energy-efficient technology and how they 
drove the four drivers of this study’s framework. This analysis was then used as the basis 
for discussions and recommendations. 
The transcribed recordings were utilized, going line by line to categorize 
participants’ comments into each of the four drivers in the campaign framework. Each 
focus group was coded separately and their comments grouped into sub-categories. From 
these sub-categories, common patterns were identified and grouped into key themes 
under each driver. Additionally, definitions of sub-categories were provided based on a 
review of the literate and refined through the data analysis (Appendix C). Each focus 
group was also compared and contrasted to identify interesting findings and trends. 
The focus group results between Marine Officers and Enlisted Marines were 
compared and contracted as well. Trends for different MOSs were identified. The two 
officer focus groups conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School were grouped together 
and the two Enlisted focus groups conducted at Camp Pendleton were grouped together 
to analyze them separately for the “within” analysis. Then, a “between” analysis was 
conducted. The results of the analysis follow in the next chapter. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The following section reports the analysis and findings. Focus group data were 
collected and analyzed to specify and explain four high-level drivers in the context of 
Marines’ adoption of energy-efficient technologies: opinion makers, communication 
methods, perception of the problem, and perception of the solution. The initial high-level 
drivers from a review of the academic literature were distilled. The focus groups were 
designed to identify Marines’ perceptions regarding concerns about and awareness of 
energy-efficient technologies. The presentation of the data documents Marines’ thoughts 
and opinions and the analysis identifies likely drivers of the adoption or non-adoption of 
energy-efficient technologies by Marines.  
The analysis was begun by grouping and categorizing comments according to 
each high-level driver. The grouping resulted in 354 comments across 161 pages, which 
were then categorized. After categorizing the comments according to the high-level 
drivers, the comments were divided into sub-categories. Each sub-category was then 
assessed on intensity and frequency. This analysis was drawn upon to discern inductively 
key themes within each high-level driver and make recommendations for the U.S. 
Marines supporting the adoption of energy-efficient technologies. This analysis shows 
that in the context of the Marine Corps and technology adoption, opinion makers includes 
those in Marines’ formal chain of command, as well as personal experiences and events. 
The methods of communication through which Marines learn or hear of new technologies 
are formal guidance, informal correspondence, and personal observation. Opinion makers 
influence Marines’ perceptions of the problem presented by dependence on fossil fuels 
and their understanding and perceptions of appropriate solutions. The Marines in this 
study perceive a key issue of fossil fuel dependency to be cost, but competing or unclear 
definitions of energy-efficient technology contributed to some confusion as to the 
definition of the problem. Marines’ perceptions of the solution (energy-efficient 
technologies) included concerns about conflicts with traditions and norms, as well as 
about product effectiveness.  
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This chapter presents the analysis of Marines’ discussion during the focus group 
sessions. First, each high-level driver is elaborated upon and the sub-categories and key 
themes explained, including quotes from the focus group sessions to support this analysis. 
Next, a summary of key themes and findings is provided. Then, NPS officer and Camp 
Pendleton enlisted focus groups were compared and contrasted by identifying similarities 
and differences. This chapter concludes with an adjusted influence campaign framework 
based on the analysis and findings. All the quotations contained in this chapter were 
acquired from a professional transcription of audio recordings of the focus group 
sessions. Therefore, if required, spelling and punctuation corrections were made; 
however, no grammatical modifications were made to any quotations.  
B. HIGH-LEVEL DRIVERS  
Drawing on the theoretical framework explained in Chapter II, comments were 
categorized according to the four high-level drivers: opinion makers, communication 
methods, perception of the problem, and perception of the solution. For each of these 
drivers, key themes were identified. To identify themes, we comments were first 
categorized into sub-categories. The sub-categories emerged from the information as it 
was read and re-read to look for commonality and patterns in the responses. For example, 
when a Marine’s quote explained that a formal supervisor has to believe and 
communicate the importance of energy-efficient technologies for it to be successful; the 
sub-category code “CoC” (representing Chain of Command) was placed next to the 
quote. A spreadsheet was then created, the rows with each type of sub-category were 
filled in, and a column added for each main driver. Next, the frequency of “CoC” was 
counted and each box was filled in for the four main drivers and sub-category. The same 
process was followed for the creation of each sub-category. The sub-categories were 
condensed into key themes based on common patterns. Definitions of sub-categories and 
coding data are located in Appendix C. 
The level of intensity of each key theme was subjectively measured by the 
emotion attached to the comment, head nodding from others in approval, and provoking 
follow-on discussion associated with each comment. Each key theme was coded with 
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“1,” “2,” or “3,” which represented little intensity, moderate intensity, and high intensity, 
respectively. The final category, individual characteristics, was explored by segmenting 
and comparing the focus groups by MOS specialty and rank across the initial four 
categories discussed below.  
1.  Opinion Makers 
Opinion makers were initially defined as anyone or anything that influences the 
end user’s decision to adopt or not adopt an energy-efficient technology. To generate 
discussion to illuminate opinion makers, participants were asked, “What specialty items 
did you use while deployed that were not issued to you?” and followed with probing 
questions, “How did you hear about it?” and, “What was most influential in your decision 
to use it?” This analysis shows that in the context of the Marine Corps and energy-
efficient technologies, opinion makers include individuals in key positions and 
occurrences the participant faced that shaped their opinion of a product. These themes 
were labeled people and events/experiences, respectively.  
a. People 
The category people include comments that indicated influence by 
individuals within the organization. Sub-categories include chain of command and 
congress. These people inside the Marine organization influence Marines’ behaviors and 
opinions through their actions (by example) or through formal and informal oral and 
written guidance. The following paragraphs explain and give examples from the focus 
group discussion to illustrate the role of chain of command and congress in Marine 
participants’ perceptions of the problem of fossil fuels and energy-efficient technologies 
as a solution. 
(1) Officers. The participants (Captains and Majors) in focus 
groups one and two emphasized the role of their Chain of Command in influencing 
behavior. Chain of command was mentioned eight times (out of 206 total comments) and 
the level of intensity was moderate (2). The transcription of these comments covered 20 
pages out of 94, which suggests that this topic was very important to the Marines. For 
example, one Marine stated:  
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Yes, really you have got to start from the top though. If it is not bought at 
the top, you can tell the captain or commander all day [long, what is] 
going to be there, but if the battalion commander doesn’t care, his priority 
is this and he goes, Look, we are doing—. What are you going to do? You 
are going to do what he tells you.” Another Marine responded with, Yes, if 
the Battalion Commander doesn’t give a shit, it doesn’t matter if the CG 
[Commanding General] cares about it, that Battalion Commander is the 
critical point of contact to those Company Commanders and everybody 
else below. 
The following quote is an example of how the participant views 
the secondary chain of command.  
Well it is every level of command. That is where it comes to. Every level 
is [responsible], start at the top. At the service level, Headquarters Marine 
Corps saying this is what we need to do so then it goes down right down to 
the [MARFOR]. Then you have got to translate how they are seeing it in 
their theater of operations. So you have got the MEF operating in 
Afghanistan, so now the MEF commander has to translate that down to his 
level, which includes a lot of air, which is a good point [participant A] said 
using a lot of it, so there is a lot there.” Another followed up with “Yes, 
you have got to have that translation of going from top to bottom. Again, 
because he says going from eight to four doesn’t mean a commander at the 
level is going to literally say we are cutting fuel and that is not what it 
means. That means that—you are operating off—that means that 
commanders get paid the big bucks to make these decisions. They have 
got planners and you have got to figure okay, the commandant says—the 
freaking [MARSOC] commander says hey, reduce fuel usage in half. Well 
part of it may be that I am going to have to condense operations 
somewhere so I am not telling freaking Charlie battery over there to cut 
their use in half.  
Another comment reinforcing the importance of the secondary 
chain of command was:  
But it was directed by the president. I was a monitor when it came down 
and we actually had to go out and establish an organization. So the 
president directed all military services to do just that, so the SECDEF and 
everybody else followed suit. We created that element to support the guys 
that we were provided. 
These comments suggest that those in a Marine’s immediate chain 
of command who influence behavior include battalion commanders, company 
commanders, sergeants major, and platoon sergeants and those in a Marine’s secondary 
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chain of command who influence behavior include any authority figure outside the 
battalion. Whether it is the immediate or secondary chain of command, the Marines’ 
comments suggest that what those in the chain of command do and say play a distinct 
role in influencing the perceptions of the end users, the Marines on the ground. 
During the first two focus groups conducted with officers at NPS, 
Marines brought up the topic of wartime funding. The frequency of comments relating to 
Congress was low (mentioned only twice); however, the level of intensity was extremely 
high (rated at 3). The Marines’ comments indicated extreme dissatisfaction and 
frustration with Congress and were illustrated by the following statements. 
Every time there is a war it doesn’t matter about resources. 
Change Congress because that is part of what this is. It is not just part of 
what we are doing. 
I think it is comical that we try and use the word efficiency when we start 
thinking about Congress and the political system because at the end of the 
day it is the most inefficient system. So we have these great notions of 
what we want to do and like forget about energy for a minute and let’s talk 
about fiscal responsibility. The military is a horrible example of fiscal 
responsibility. We are the most irresponsibly organized group because of 
the way Congress sets it up. If you don’t spend it, you don’t get it next 
year. Like there is no; hey, let’s plan to set this money aside. It is like you 
said, feast or famine. 
Marine Officers’ comments suggest that participants believe that 
every time the United States is involved in a conflict, Congress fulfills the monetary 
requirements to complete the mission. This reality causes widespread belief that 
unlimited funding is available, which in turn, increases energy consumption through 
unlimited resources. The Marines seem to relate the financial and political actions of 
Congress as a negative opinion maker to adopting energy-efficient technologies.  
(2) Enlisted. Similarly, enlisted participants mentioned the role 
of chain of commend in influencing behavior. Chain of command was mentioned 13 




transcribed text for the enlisted focus groups analyzed). The intensity of these comments 
was assessed as high (3) due to the considerable follow-on discussion and emotion in 
body language and tone.  
A Marine made a general comment about a broad category of 
people, which illustrated the importance of people in the chain of command on Marines’ 
perceptions and behavior. “Even Sergeants and above ‘cause they’re the ones that, 
honestly, do all the work, fix everything, they try out everything.” 
Similarly, a Marine commented on the importance of Marines in 
general: 
I’d just seen older Marines using them, They’re like, “Hey, you should 
probably get one of these ‘cause they’ll really help you out.” All right, if it 
works for you, it’s gonna work for me. 
Other comments indicate the importance of particular roles. For 
example, one Marine commented:  
Like Sgt. [xxx] was saying like he trusts Gunny, like it was one of those 
things like, when I first came into the fleet and my Squad Leader, he’d 
say, Go buy some cat eyes, you know, you’ve got to see this reflective 
stuff, go buy this, go buy that, you need it, you’re going to need it,” like I 
looked up to him, I trust him, it’s someone you’re going to trust, if they 
tell you to go do something, you’re gonna do it because, one, it’s going to 
save your life, two, you know they’re right… 
Another Marine expanded on that comment by agreeing that the 
Gunnery Sergeant would have a high impact: 
I would do it because I know Gunny, I trust Gunny, I trust his word, you 
know what I mean? But if, no offense to anyone, other in the room, but, I 
mean, if someone told me, Hey this really works, try it, I’d have to try it 
myself first because I don’t know them. 
Based on the head nodding in approval following these comments, 
the data suggest that enlisted Marines not only put a lot of trust in those people in their 
chain of command, and specifically, trust key people and value their opinions. The 
Marine that made this comment works for the Gunnery Sergeant he is referring to and he 
did not know the other Marines in the room, which suggests that Marines have a higher 
 37 
probability of adopting energy-efficient technologies if they heard positive stories about 
it from another Marine they personally know. Also suggested is that Marines are less 
likely to adopt energy-efficient technologies if someone they do not know told them 
about it or showed them the equipment.  
The Battalion Commander was another key person. One Marine 
commented on the importance of the Battalion Commander: “The Battalion Commander 
might say, Hey, this is the best cover in the world, [then] everybody will wear it.” 
This next comment shows the intensity and suggests how Marines 
think certain key people in the chain of command are highly important in shaping 
opinions: 
If it’s not in the Sergeant Major’s or the Battalion Commander’s interest, 
they’re not going to talk to the Battalion about it, they’re not going to give 
a shit about it, you know what I mean? 
These comments unsurprisingly show that the enlisted Marines 
trust the word of other Marines. Sergeants and above, gunnery sergeants, or battalion 
commanders are likely to be particularly influential. These two previous comments 
suggest that enlisted Marines think that if their leadership is not interested in energy-
efficient technologies, the adoption and integration into the unit will be less likely to 
occur. 
b.  Experiences/Events 
The second key theme in the comments organized in the opinion maker 
category is “experiences/events.” This theme includes the sub-categories prior 
experience, observability, and video games. These sub-categories were grouped into 
“experiences/events” because they are direct incidents that form a Marine’s perception of 
a product in a negative or positive way. The results achieved after using a certain item 
drove them to think positively or negatively about a product. The successful use of items 
on deployments in harsh conditions had greater influence than those used in more 
benevolent conditions due to the technology or product surviving in an extreme 
environment. The Marines in the focus groups stressed the need to be able to rely on their 
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equipment. Some stated their preference of direct experience over any other source of 
influence. These Marines expressed that direct experience would allow them to feel 
confident in battle situations by knowing that equipment has previously worked and 
resulted in successful outcomes. Only officers are discussed in the following section. The 
enlisted Marines in this study did not discuss events or experiences, which was surprising 
because that sub-category was popular for the officers. This data suggest that enlisted 
Marines put their trust solely on people. 
The first sub-category in events/experiences is “prior experience,” which 
is defined as a Marine’s personal experience with a product. A Marine commented on a 
positive experience with an energy-efficient technology, but indicated capability issues. 
The Marine stated,  
I have used the spaces and greens systems. We had a limited amount 
fielded to my battalion. Some of the companies had it, but they didn’t have 
it company-wide. They had a couple of platoons with it here or a couple of 
COPs [Combat Out-Post] there. It was pretty good stuff, but the problem 
is when they took it down to the individual piece of say a radio trying to 
have some sort of solar rechargeable, solar operated—solar powered radio, 
but the problem was they weren’t compatible with all the different types of 
radio systems. I mean even the radios that we have out there today, every 
battery—most people think that you know that these things called a 5590, 
they think that battery can power everything, but it is just not true. So it 
becomes for us, for me as a communications officer in a ground combat 
element, it was an issue of compatibility and availability. 
Thus, for this Marine, direct experience suggested that the energy-efficient technology 
was effective, but not prepared for total integration in the Marine Corps. However, 
another Marine with a positive perception based on prior experience with energy-efficient 
technology, responded:  
Yes, two things I saw. Both kind of abstract, but one was we employed a 
thing called the M2C2. It was a mobile command post, we will just call it 
that. But the thing that was nice about it is it had all my coms and 
everything built into it and C2 facilities so they could take one truck and 
they could drive that one truck, though putting all your eggs in one basket 
was kind of dangerous. That one truck could do the same as an entire 
regimental CP of 40 trucks. So one versus 40 when you start to look at the 
footprint of that log train, to me that is not necessarily having a more 
efficient truck that can get more miles per gallon, it probably got less, but 
 39 
because you are reducing all those—the log train that is supporting the 
COC because you have consolidated, it kind of is energy-efficient and we 
are going to that technology with the [NODM] I think is what they are 
calling it now. [NODM] is kind of like the next generation of stuff that the 
Marine Corps is going to. So that is one way to look at it is, hey maybe we 
put some of our money towards these packages because I know the MRQ-
12 van for aviation guys and [MRQ-13], those are the same kind of things 
we could focus that energy-efficient technology by reducing the log train 
and supply train behind it. 
Comments suggested that the M2C2 and the GREEN technology system 
provided Marines with positive experiences, which resulted in positive perceptions of 
energy-efficient technologies.  
The second subcategory is indirect experience, which is defined as hearing 
or viewing others’ experiences about energy-efficient technologies. The data suggest that 
a Marine may be more likely to adopt a technology if others this person knows have used 
it and found it to be reliable and useful. The experience of other Marines influences 
decision makers, which allows them to feel more confident in the equipment even with a 
lack of their own direct experience. For example, discussing aftermarket products, a 
Marine explained:  
I know our squadron when they were there, they had started using iPads in 
the cockpit, even though it wasn’t authorized, to replace their [maps] 
because we don’t have a moving map, we don’t have anything we can just 
sit on—you have got a telephone book and maps and they actually went 
out and the squadron took squadron phones [inaudible] iPad and now they 
are moving towards an android based. But that was initially a west coast 
squadron used [inaudible] to buy it and then they would pass it on to the 
replacement squadron. But they bought iPads and—. 
This comment generated discussion from three other Marines in the focus group who had 
the similar experience with iPads. Due to the follow-on discussion, the level of intensity 
of this comment was rated as high (3). The data suggest that Marines will have a higher 




The third sub-category was the effect video games have on Marines, 
which is an interesting blend of direct and indirect experience. While the playing of the 
game is direct, the technology or product is a representation. In both focus groups 
Marines gave examples of using gear they had previously used (in representation form) in 
the video game Call of Duty®. The comments suggest that the equipment special 
operations characters in Call of Duty use influence Marines. For example, Marines from 
focus groups 1 and 2, listed respectively, commented:  
Like one of my [Marines] was a huge Call of Duty guy. He actually had a 
point—we put a magazine [pouch] on the front of our flack and you 
could—you know every time we realized that it would get in the [way]. So 
we had to change the SOP and it was still [a problem, we] couldn’t move 
when it was inside [a vehicle]. So this kid, I think he got it from Call of 
Duty, came up with the leg pouch ones where you just strap it on your leg 
and put your magazine pouches there. 
Most Marines are influenced by video games. When asked Have your 
Marines been affected by Call of Duty or some other Video Game? their 
response was a resounding Oh yes. Some Marine units changed the type of 
equipment they used based on the way it was used in a video game as 
mentioned above. Additionally, one Marine commented, They want to be 
unique and want to be [cool] and they want to be part of Call of Duty, 
basically. 
The frequency of video game related comments were low (two times), but 
the emotion and follow-on discussion indicated a high intensity level (3) and resonance. 
The Marines participating in this study viewed video games as an influential opinion 
maker because these games gave them the ability to test a product virtually in a combat 
environment. Importantly, the fact that the test was virtual did not seem to detract from 
the influence generated by the experience. 
Based on the data, people were the only opinion maker for the enlisted 
Marines. They did not provide comments on events or experiences, which was surprising 
because that sub-category was popular for the officers. This data suggest that enlisted 
Marines put their trust solely on people. 
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From these comments, two surprising themes were identified. The first 
theme was the effect Congress had on the Marine officers from the first focus group. The 
Marines related energy-efficient technologies with financial responsibility. As mentioned 
above, the comments suggest the actions of Congress effect how seriously Marines view 
certain initiatives, such as energy-efficient technologies in particular. The second theme 
was the effect video games have on Marines. In both focus groups, examples of Marines 
using a certain piece of gear were based on the gear used in Call of Duty. The comments 
seem to suggest that Marines are influenced by what special operations characters in the 
Call of Duty games are equipped with. Communication methods are discussed next.  
2. Communication Methods 
Communication methods are defined as the medium by which information is 
transmitted to a Marine. Identifying the effective communication channels is important 
because communication channels spread information, and ultimately, link “opinion 
makers” to Marines’ “perceptions” and acceptance of energy-efficient technologies. To 
generate discussion to bring out communication channels, participants were asked 
probing questions, such as, “How did you hear about it?” “How did you come to the 
decision to use it?” “Was that communication method effective?” Based on the frequency 
of responses and the discussion, the following key themes were identified: formal 
guidance, informal correspondence, and personal observation within the driver, 
communications methods. 
a. Formal Guidance 
Formal guidance includes written guidance in directives and After Action 
Reports (AARs), and verbal orders passed down the chain of command. The sub-
categories that comprise formal guidance are formal communications, AARs, and 
limiting resources because they are official methods of communications in the Marine 
Corps that have specific transmission channels.  
(1) Officers. Communicating through the chain of command is 
a formal method used daily to pass information up and down Marine ranks, and it comes 
in various methodologies. The more direct communication methods that Marine Corps 
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officers discussed during the focus groups came in form of written documents and or 
verbally communicated from a top down approach. For instance, one Marine commented:  
But it was directed by the president. I was a monitor when it came down 
and we actually had to go out and establish an organization. So the 
president directed all military services to do just that, so the SECDEF and 
everybody else followed suit. We created that element to support the guys 
that we were provided. 
Another Marine had the Commandant’s agenda in a formal written 
guidance emailed to them at their command.” To that comment, one Marine stated:  
Yes, probably some of you have read the commandant’s guidance on this 
energy-efficient technologies and in that document it kind of alludes to the 
fact that our reliance on fossil fuels is a critical vulnerability and the use of 
energy-efficient technologies is a critical capability. What are the 
measures of effectiveness? How do you define the way—the commandant 
alludes to it as it will enhance the combat effectiveness of the unit? So he 
talks about weaving this idea and the acceptance of it into the ethos of the 
Marine Corps and how that gets done. Well how do you even define the 
measure of effectiveness of these technologies? Is it number of lives saved 
because now we only have to do—there is a stat in the thing that says one 
death per 50 convoys? Is it now we extend that to 100 convoys per one 
death? Is that a measure of effectiveness that we are looking for? So to get 
the average lance corporal to buy into these things and okay, how is it 
going to affect my ability to move, shoot, and communicate and 
accomplish my mission at the grunt level? I don’t think we have defined 
that exactly. 
This communication channel has an impact on the Marines who 
actually read it. While it may not be a popular method, it still impacts the Marines’ 
perception of key topics and initiatives. Based on this Marine’s comment, the data 
suggest that the message of the use of energy-efficient technology was conveyed by the 
Commandant as clear and concise; however, the method of distribution was not effective 
because only one officer from the first focus group read the Commandant’s Energy 
guidance based on a follow-up question generated from another Marine: 
I just want to say something. This points out what [Marine participant] 
was talking about when he said that he read this letter from the 
commandant. How many others, just show of hands, actually read that? 
(No hands were raised) 
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Additionally, many Marines commented on the importance of 
formal guidance as a communication method:  
General Nally visited two years ago or something. He selectively told a 
bunch of Marines hey, you are going to be part of the new Energy 
Efficiency Department in the Marine Corps. There was a big hype about it 
and everybody was onboard, [they were] excited. They restructured the 
curriculum to take specific classes, economics related classes, etc. Then 
lately you know you talk to these Marines that got selected for this 
Energy-efficient Department on the ITM side of the house, basically most 
of the [COMOs] and stuff. Now you talk to them and they are saying, 
“Well it is kind of dying down. There is not much hype about it.” So we 
are thinking well, where did it originally generate? Where did the hype 
start from? Was it the secretary of the Navy? Is it the Commandant of the 
Marine Corp’s big idea? Who did that and what is the current office in the 
Marine Corps doing about it right now as well? 
Marines conveyed, through the number of comments generated 
(11), which formal guidance from top leadership is essential to convey Marine Corps 
initiatives but must be translated down to the lowest level. As one Marine commented: 
Well it is every level of command. That is where it comes to. Every level 
is [responsible], start at the top. At the service level, Headquarters Marine 
Corps saying this is what we need to do so then it goes down right down to 
the [MARFOR]. Then you have to translate how they are seeing it in their 
theater of operations. So you have got the MEF operating in Afghanistan, 
so now the MEF commander has to translate that down to his 
level…Which [passed down] to now the division, down to the [next level], 
the battalion, that makes that company [care]. Those commanders, how 
that affects them, that translates to them. [That’s what responsible] leaders 
do. 
To do this top down communication approach, Marines explained 
that some commands would hold “stand-downs” and inform every one of a current 
training initiative or current events. This “stand-down” can occur any time and any 
location. For example, one Marine stated:  
All hands in the gym [huge formation in the gym], get everybody down, 
sit everybody down. Sometimes they use PowerPoint presentations, but 
usually that is the way that [information is passed]. 
Nine out of 11 participants in the first officer focus group agreed 
that it is a common method of communication in the Marine Corps and is effective at 
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reaching a large audience in a small amount of time. This medium is good to get the word 
out but is not effective when it comes to enforcing changes or having a deep impact as 
indicated in one Marine participant statement:  
I think that is the big piece of all of this as far as changing the mindset of 
the Marines and that is really what key leaders, the company commanders, 
captains, lieutenants and at that level—really, if you want to buy into this 
it has to be from the top down. Really at our level you have to take it, 
really accept it and push it to the Marines. Not just push it in the 
formations and say, Hey, here is what is going on. Read this. 
The AAR was another form of communication mentioned. It  is a 
formal method of communication Marines trust and use regularly. The AAR is not only a 
communication channel but also functions as an opinion maker. Opinions are formed 
based on the information within the communication of an AAR to Marine MOS 
communities. For example, Marine artillery units will send their AARs to other artillery 
units to enhance their success further and share lessons learned. Therefore, its 
significance is quite important. Marines use and trust AARs to help them make better 
decisions in the field. For example, one Marine stated:  
Yes, you have [After Action Reports]. You get [home after deployment] 
and after action [reports] gets compiled so [the] the system commander [is 
made aware]—hey, we look we have a real requirement, we need to fix 
this. 
Their adoption was then increase because they are now better 
suited to the needs of the Marines. As one Marine commented”  
You get after action [reports] and this gets compiled so then the system 
commander [says] hey, look we have a real requirement, we need to fix 
this pack. 
Based on these comments, AARs seem to suggest that Marines 
value this type of communication tool to spread information. 
Although some of the sub-categories do not exhibit formal written 
guidance, verbal orders and/or the actions of leaders set a precedence of the leadership’s 
priorities in form of limiting resources. This somewhat drastic method seems to convey 
an indirect message to Marines. For example, one Marine quoted:  
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The only way you can do that is cut the fuel in half and say here is what 
you have, live within it. This is the only way to do it. If you consume 100 
gallons of fuel a day and you want to cut that to 50, the only way to do 
that is to only supply 50. 
This method led to another Marine who provided an example of 
limiting resources with the following statement:  
One thing that I saw happen right before I left Kandahar was that we had a 
set number of vehicles that were assigned to site command [out] there. 
Basically they limited the amount of use or the amount of fuel that we 
were allowed to give for those vehicles. So instead of driving all over base 
anytime we wanted, we had to be a little bit more efficient or judicious on 
how we used those vehicles. 
Additionally, another Marine continued in the discussion by stating 
that leadership actions are integral in sending a message that involves limiting resources 
as a means of communication based on the following comment:  
I think from the top down the way you communicate—like I said if you 
have say I am just going to throw fictitious numbers out there. If you have 
a company of Marines that uses 100 gallons of fuel a day and you want to 
cut that metric in half you say, alright, I want it to be cut in half. I only 
want you to use 50 gallons of fuel a day. If you still provide that company 
with 100 gallons of fuel a day, they are going to use it. 
These statements seem to suggest that by limiting resources, the 
Marine Corps is sending a clear message of the importance of energy efficiency, which 
demonstrates a top-down approach, from the President, to the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, to the individual Marine. An agreement seemed to exist that this method was 
effective because Marines find a way to fulfill the mission regardless of the amount of 
resources provided. From these comments, the data seem to suggest that Marine officers 
are slightly aware of the Marine Corps energy initiatives but are unclear of the why, and 
the purpose behind them. 
(2)  Enlisted. From the comments during both enlisted focus 
groups, formal guidance as a means of communication seemed to be significant in 
listening to the remarks. However, enlisted Marines did not mention AARs as a means of 
communication, which could explain why they did not have events or experiences as an 
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opinion maker. Additionally, enlisted Marines did not provide any examples of hearing 
about energy-efficient initiatives but did state that formal guidance would be the best 
means of relaying the information. When the question was asked, “So what have you 
heard from higher about conserving energy? And define higher when, when you answer 
this question.” The response was, “Any higher-ranking than me, I haven’t heard nothing 
about it.” 
From the reaction from the rest of the enlisted Marines, this 
statement seemed to be the consensus of the focus group. However, a follow-on comment 
seemed to suggest that the method of communication should be from formal guidance 
pushed down. For example, one Marine commented:  
Umm, [It has to] start from the top, like Sergeant said, it’s gotta come 
from the top, the commander gives his intent and spreads it down to the 
staff and it’s up to the staff to spread it out. 
The data suggest that one way enlisted Marines receive 
information is through their chain of command in the form of formal guidance. 
Comments relating to formal guidance and communications, and through limiting 
resources, were mentioned four, six, five times, respectively. The intensity of these 
comments is high (3) due to the follow-on discussion, which included many agreeing 
comments from other Marines and emotion through raised voices and excited body 
language.  
b.  Informal Correspondence 
Informal correspondence includes word of mouth and news publications 
as an informal way of communicating from one Marine to another. An example would be 
one Marine talking to another Marine about a personal experience in an informal way.  
(1)  Officers. In the officer focus groups, the Marines indicate 
that informal correspondence is a highly used method of communication as illustrated in 
the following quotes. For example, one Marine commented, “Absolutely. Pre-deployment 
everybody is like “Hey, where did you get that?” Next thing you know everybody has got 
the same GPS.” 
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Another Marine commented on hearing a story about GREENS 
from a peer, which illustrates the importance of word of mouth as a communication 
channel:  
I can’t speak personally on the use of it, I can only speak of what [I heard] 
talking to friends of mine in the artillery community that actually used 
them out in 29 Palms and things I heard back from it was it was a good 
intention, but in order to get the gear out there it took an entirely separate 
seven ton. As well as when you get out there for artillery, the intent is get 
it in place very fast, fire downrange very fast to support the unit you are 
shooting for and setting these up from my understanding was pretty 
difficult. 
This comment seems to suggest that this particular Marine had no real personal 
experience with energy conserving technologies but trusted the stories he heard and put a 
large amount of trust in his peers’ views. 
The data suggest that views held by the Marines in the focus group 
were strong and authoritative enough to illustrate that they trusted their source and 
believed them wholeheartedly even though they had not come in contact with a particular 
product. One particular example was the use of iPad’s onboard helicopters. The iPads 
were being used for onboard maps vice existing maps due to how effective they were: 
I know our squadron…started using iPads in the cockpit, even though it 
wasn’t authorized, to replace their [maps] because we don’t have a moving 
map…But that was initially a west coast squadron used [item] to buy it 
and then they would pass it on to the replacement squadron. 
Another Marine continued the discussion stating:  
Well that was the thing. I think it was a west coast squadron that started it. 
Like 169, I think [they] might have started it and then they just passed it 
on and then everybody went, Oh this is a great idea. A moving map that 
we can actually use in the cockpit. [That is] exactly how it happened. 
Guys came into our Squadron Support Division, the Aviation Supply 
Department and they were like, Hey we saw this squadron out there while 
we were doing this training and they had these iPads and it was great. Can 




These word of mouth examples are simple, yet an effective communication method used 
among Marines. Word of mouth was mentioned four times; however, the message that 
was conveyed through word of mouth influenced a Marine to adopt or not adopt a 
specific product, which was rated (3) on the intensity scale.  
The Marines in both NPS focus groups said that USMC 
publications were a method of communication that provided some positive press on the 
use of energy-efficient technologies. In November 2012, the Marine Corps Gazette 
published an article discussing the use of an energy-efficient technology in Helmand 
Province, Afghanistan. This particular technology is Ground Renewable Expeditionary 
Energy Network Systems (GREENS). The article not only elaborated on the purpose of 
GREENS but also its success in improving the communication reliability in the field 
through solar arrays. As one Marine commented:  
I actually had a buddy who was one of the first guys to work in the 
Expeditionary Energy Office and he went to Afghanistan and installed the 
solar panels out there and it seemed like it was a pretty big hit for the 
locals out there and it worked pretty well. It got an article written up in the 
Gazette and everything. It worked out well for him, so I think that is a 
success story in a sea of angst that is sort of building here. 
This comment was followed up by another comment relating 
publications as a means of communication by providing the following statement: 
Over the years there has been articles in Gazette, Leatherneck, that cover 
expeditionary energy-efficient systems. I believe that the GREENS 
[technology] I never saw any deployed, but there [have] been articles over 
the last couple of years that have been talking about it. 
Both these examples seem to suggest that Marines are either 
reading or hearing about positive outcomes of energy-efficient technology from different 
modes of publications, but how Marines value the publication, as truth, is another story.  
(2) Enlisted. The trend of word of mouth and news 
publications continued as an informal way of communicating from one Marine to another 
during the enlisted focus groups. However, news publications seemed not to be a relevant 
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mode of communications due to the reality that enlisted Marines would tend not to read 
about energy-efficient initiates as evident in the following comments:  
Everybody reads the Marine Times. 
That would be a good venue. 
But, that being said, who reads the Marine Times, sees energy-efficiency, 
and then skips past to [the pay article]. 
The following series of comments seem to suggest that enlisted 
Marines read the Marine Corps Times but will only read an article that provides some 
sort of value to them. One method brought up time and time again was just through word 
of mouth. Word of mouth was mentioned 10 times between both of the enlisted focus 
groups and the intensity was a high (3) based on the following discussion and agreement 
amongst the Marines. For example, one Marine commented on certain equipment: 
If it works maybe I’ll tell people, that, Yeah, this is legit, you know, It’s 
awesome, I’ve had it for a year and it hasn’t broke, you know, stuff like 
that. 
Additionally, other comments referenced the use of word of mouth 
as a means of communication by adding into the discussion about 550 cord (a commonly 
used rope with a tensile strength of 550 pounds).  
I would probably continue using it, I would tell other Marines about it, 
you know, share it, have them use it, you know, tell them where they can 
go get it, thinks like that, of course, you know? If I think it’s better than 
550 cord. 550 cord is amazing, it’s an amazing piece of equipment. 
New publications, based on the comments, seemed to be a good 
method of communication “because everyone reads the Marine Corps Times” but articles 
must provide some sort of benefit to the reader to achieve interest that in turn might 
translate into successful adoption. On the other hand, the data suggest that word of mouth 
is the most effective communication channel because that is how Marines spread 
information. Marines seem to tell other Marines about a product that was successful or 
vice versa. In both these instances, Marines are putting value in what other Marines say 
and are drawn to material that can provide some sort of benefit to them.  
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c.  Personal Observation 
Personal observation is the critical component that Marines indicated as a 
means of communication. For example, a Marine using a piece of equipment and 
experiencing its pros and cons as a way of receiving information about it carries a lot of 
weigh in the product’s effectiveness that establishes acceptance. From the responses and 
reaction from the Marines, sub-categories were identified that comprise personal 
observation: demonstration, reliability, and proof of concept.  
(1) Officers. Marines stated that testing the new technology 
was a chief characteristic and driver of adoption. Not only does the existence of test data 
have to be present, it also has to be reliable as one Marine indicated in the following 
comment. “Since it is a new technology there could be kinks in it, so reliability may be an 
issue.” 
A successful proof of concept of a new technology must perform 
as intended by the supplier in various environments. For example, one Marine participant 
stated:  
The key initially I think is going to be that this is got to be like a 
supplemental. You have got a proof of concept. Say like the MTVR, the 
sides become solar panels. They simply run that to an outlet where you 
can like plug into for other things and you can power, so again it becomes 
a power source. If it breaks, we don’t have that power, so it doesn’t affect 
the running of the vehicle. See what I am saying? 
From this comment, it could be argued that Marines have a higher 
likelihood of adopting energy conserving technology if  a certain degree of trust exists in 
the products’ tested capabilities. By observing a product’s effectiveness through a proof 
of concept, and determining if it is reliable or not, translates into adoption or non-
adoption.  
In analyzing the responses to understand how a Marine is passed 
information, and then in turn, determines if it is an effective communication method, 
several noteworthy discoveries were found. First, formal guidance from the chain of 
command is necessary as a mode of communication but must contain sincere motives. In 
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essence, leaders at each level in the chain of command must communicate to their units 
why energy-efficient technologies is important and translate the value it provides to adopt 
them. Marines also said that leaders need to set the example in garrison (units at their 
permanent military post) to communicate consistency based on the following comment; 
But I mean this guy [would have to walk the walk]. I mean if he said—you 
know when [I turn off my lights] in the morning. Then his was off. You 
know? If the colonel’s is off then yours better not be on. It is that kind of 
mindset. If the colonel can do this [I can] but there has got to be no sense 
of entitlement or exclusion to the rule. When you push solar power but 
then you see the CGs can with a dedicated generator it kind of sends the 
wrong message. It also happens in garrison. When you work in a building 
with three generals or three people with stars on their collars and each of 
them has their own Chevy Tahoe with a driver, it just sends the wrong 
message. 
In other words, the idea or concept of energy efficiency would be 
engrained at all levels and stressed as a way of life. It would set the example and 
communicate that energy-efficient behaviors are a way of life and would increase the 
likelihood of adopting energy-efficient technologies. This example would have to be 
continuous, consistent, and supported at all levels. Secondly, word of mouth was a trusted 
avenue to relay information from one person to another. Marines value another Marines’ 
comments or suggestions, whether through written material, such as AARs, or as simple 
as verbal communication methods.  
(2)  Enlisted. Personal observation was also important as a 
means of communication during the enlisted focus groups by referencing it four times. 
However, from the responses and reaction from the Marines, it was determined that the 
proof of concept, demonstration, and reliability comments fit better in the perception of 
solution high-level driver section. With that said, enlisted Marines conveyed that personal 
observation was an important communication method. For example, one Marine 
commented: 
Because you’ve used it and it works or you’ve seen people using it and it 
works or a friend told you that it works or things like that, things of that 
nature, you know, so…um, you really don’t use one until you buy one so 
you’re kind of taking everybody else’s word for it. 
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This comment seems to suggest that observing a product and its usefulness is essential for 
adoption.  
The following list highlights the top three channels of 
communication by importance (1 being the most important): 
1. Word of Mouth 
2. Formal Guidance 
3. Personal Observation 
The data suggest that Marines rely on other Marines for 
information, which is done informally, through discussions with peers (word of mouth). 
This communication channel was the strongest based on frequency and intensity. The 
second channel, formal guidance, is through the chain of command issuing written or 
verbal orders. The data suggest that it is also highly effective due to the nature of the 
military culture. The third channel, personal observation, is achieved through personally 
experiencing the advantages and disadvantages of a certain technology. The experience 
itself is a communication channel that also leads to Word of Mouth.  
3. Perception of the Problem 
In the framework, identified is a Marine’s awareness of the need for energy-
efficient technologies as an important driver of adoption. The literature suggests that 
Marine’s perception of the need for energy-efficient technologies will affect successful 
adoption or resistance. Thus, Marines’ perceptions of the problem created by fossil fuel 
dependency are explored. In “perception of the problem,” we the following key themes 
are identified: definition of energy-efficient technology, and perceived image of energy-
efficient technologies. 
a.  Definition of Energy-efficient Technology 
The Marines in this focus groups agreed that using resources is a cost of 
doing business. They understand that fossil fuel use may be a problem but they are not 
quite sure how to define or specify it. Therefore, “definition of energy-efficient 
technology” was identified as a key theme. The issue of definition was mentioned 12 
times. The overall intensity was high (3) because of the emotion and follow-on 
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discussion. The Marines’ comments can be divided into two categories. The first category 
is behavior versus technology. Some Marines think energy efficiency should come in the 
form of equipment in the deployed environment. Some Marines define energy-efficient 
technology as something that helps change behavior. These multiple views illustrate that 
Marines have different opinions about what the problem is. The data suggest that some 
think it is a behavioral problem while others think it is a technological problem. An 
example would be using existing equipment but altering behaviors to consume less 
power. Shutting off lights and turning engines off when not in use is a specific example. 
One Marine commented:  
Yes, we probably need to just do a survey and find out where are the costs 
coming from and you know if we are looking at the tactical threshold 
versus the facility threshold, figure out that first and separate those. Some 
will mesh on both. 
This data suggest that Marines think that it is important to identify the high-cost drivers 
and alter behavior to avoid high costs. It also suggests that a difference exists between 
energy efficiency in facilities (barracks or bases) and the energy efficiency that would be 
used in the field. Similarly, another Marine stated:  
Well that was what I was saying. I think there are two different sides. 
There may be the more technical side of energy efficiencies and then there 
is the more cost cutting savings like hey, it is like telling your kids to turn 
off the lights in the house type of deal. If you are working, then you are 
going to lunch for two hours, well turn off the lights. You know? Is there 
two different areas that you can focus on? 
Then, another Marine states that he has only seen energy efficiency as a 
behavioral factor and nothing else:  
Okay, so in a garrison fleet environment, the first time I remember, you 
know, ‘turn your lights off,’ the government is requiring us to cut back our 
energy consumption—electricity basically. So you know now all the 
rooms have to be set to [a certain temperature]. You have to suffer. When 
it is hot, you know instead of being 72 it is 74 or 76. So it was a facilities 
standpoint. [That was] the first time that I can remember hearing it. The 
automatic light switches in rooms, you know having the duty to make sure 
you walk around and shut all the lights off when everybody is gone, 
turning computer monitors off to meet the standards that [were being set] 
and I don’t remember who created it, but the 30% reduction basically in 
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DoD energy use. So for me, from a facilities ground logistics perspective, 
that was the first time that energy efficiency was ever discussed. Now it is 
hardly ever discussed in a deployed environment, but it is really only in a 
garrison environment. 
Another Marine commented as to why he thought the USMC is 
concentrating on behavior in garrison: 
But in the strategy, the Marine Corps is starting off with facilities so that 
we can see the plausibility of how it goes in an expeditionary 
environment.  
I would argue that is a big problem with the Marine Corps because we 
have gotten so wrapped around the axel on large installations, large 
[bases] you know? We are looking at the low hanging fruit of these 
massive structures, but are we planning on fighting another Afghanistan 
where we go and set up huge bases, which by the way, undermining our 
entire amphibious doctrine? 
This comment suggests that Marines think the Marine Corps are trying to 
change behavior first, which will lead to the adoption of energy-efficient technologies 
later. This Marine, however, thought the idea of having big bases while in theater goes 
against the Marine Corps methodology of being an expeditionary force, which would 
suggest the whole point is moot. 
Furthermore, another Marine raised the issue that additional uses of power 
on bases while deployed could be avoided.  These data suggest that a whole category of 
behaviors could be eliminated or reduced to include the restaurants and shops on big 
bases in theater, such as Kandahar and Leatherneck. 
A lot of stuff that is out there now is just creature comfort stuff. Like you 
go to Leatherneck and they have got Wi-Fi for everybody, you know I 
remember when I was in Al Asad we had Baskin Robbins, Burger King, I 
mean Kandahar we had TGIFridays there on the boardwalk. There were 
all kinds of stuff there that were not [essential]. You don’t need it. I mean 
it is great to have it, it keeps Marines occupied and out of trouble and 
makes them feel more at home I guess, but you know there is a lot of 
burdens that we put on ourselves. 
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Technology is the second part of this category of defining what energy-
efficient technology is, which includes using energy-efficient equipment, such as solar 
panels in the field or a hybrid Humvee. The data suggest that some Marines think the 
emphasis on energy efficiency should be on technologies used in the field on deployment. 
One Marine commented: 
Well I think again it is two issues because this comes down to money 
when we talked about the installations and solar power and it is obviously 
a long term [solution] to save money in budget constraints. So that is one 
thing that they are going [to] and a lot of that we do go in theater 
somewhere and you do set up a large logistics operations kind of control 
hub that obviously, basically, you can do that same thing to reduce your 
requirements for fuel for generators in Iraq and Afghanistan. But [let’s] 
truly talk expeditionary, you know, we need to think of like that battalion, 
that company out operating. It is hard because OIF and OEF, a lot of what 
we have been doing is based off operating and people are thinking of the 
big FOBs which are bases almost, but I think the key forward is what you 
are saying. That company going forward out operating, hey you have got 
vehicles you know, you [have got] an MRAP, a MTVR, a Humvee, the 
next joint fighting vehicle, with Marines in it, the gear we carry, how can 
we use this energy-efficient technology? That is where the real problem is 
because everybody knows it is easy to put solar panels on base and hey, 
we can save some money hopefully long term after we recoup the initial 
cost to reduce the need for fossil fuels. 
This data suggest that Marines do not know how energy-efficient 
technologies will be used in the field or IF they can be used in the field at all. The data 
suggest they doubt their purpose in a deployed environment. Furthermore, another 
Marine stated that the focus should be on equipment used in the field: 
Even though I haven’t seen this used in a military application it is out 
there and it just becomes whether it becomes cost effective. I think solar 
power has a lot of opportunity, but it needs to be [adapted] to the point of 
use and I think that can be done because now they basically [have] solar 
panels woven into a lot of materials. So I mean you can put that [into a lot 
of things]. It can be incorporated into the [Alice] packs, whatever we call 
them, the [Molly] packs—whatever the name is now for the packs. Even 
possibly into your uniform into like your cover or something. These are 
the kinds of things to be able to get enough to provide [energy] because if 
you can do that point of use, everybody has it, then everybody has enough 
for themselves. Even like vehicles, like generators, make it as part of the 
generator itself so that way obviously you know you are going to need to 
 56 
run a generator, but integrating into the casing solar panels to provide that 
extra boost when you don’t have to run the generator as much if you are 
able during good weather. But those kinds of things, incorporating it into 
literally vehicles and somehow like into the sides of MTVR. 
This comment suggests that energy efficiency should be focused on equipment brought 
into the field. It should be involved with equipment that everybody or every unit is issued 
so everybody can be energy-efficient.  
The second category of definition is focus. Some Marines think the 
Marine Corps have the wrong focus. The data suggest that some Marines think the focus 
should be on units that consume the most resources (Aviation); however, the aviation fuel 
is taken out of Navy’s budget and is not a Marine issue. Even though some Marines think 
Aviation should be targeted for efficiency improvements, they also think it is impossible: 
I think anywhere you have aircraft there is a pretty good footprint. 
Anyway…I think you kind of hit on it too, you are not going to make a jet 
engine much [more energy-efficient]. I mean yes, there are incremental 
gains in efficiency, but that is not really what we are talking about. There 
is a huge amount of GSE or just the personnel to maintain that and 
maintain the aircraft. 
Another Marine commented on how difficult it would be to make the 
aviation community more energy-efficient:  
Impossible, yes. Making the actual aircraft more efficient? You know fuel 
is a source of energy, so how are we going to get an F18 from consuming 
600 gallons to 400 gallons? 
Vigorous nods of approval were seen when the Marines were asked if the 
aviation community uses the most fuel. In other words, the community with the highest 
fuel cost has the most potential to reduce costs. Due to the nature of aircraft, however, the 
Marines agreed that this would be impossible. Therefore, the perception of this part of the 
problem is that it cannot be fixed at this time. 
In addition, another Marine alluded that the Marine Corps is straying away 
from their grass-roots methodology as an amphibious force, which leads them to focus on 
the wrong type of equipment to adapt into energy-efficient technologies: 
 57 
You both bring up really good points and I think there is a big 
misconception of what energy-efficient technology is versus trying to find 
ways to suck more energy and stick it on non-energy-efficient 
technologies like the MRAP is not energy-efficient. [That would] require 
humongous amounts of cooling power in order to facilitate. We get 
spoiled and we have FOBs out in Iraq that had satellite television being 
pumped out to them. You know, like what is going on? The amphibious 
doctrine, the quick expeditionary force that we were before Iraq and 
Afghanistan is dwindling and now we are losing sight of that and now we 
are not looking at what is energy-efficient like [what] in a backpack is 
energy-efficient? We are looking at like MTVRs and like MRAPs. 
Therefore, part of the problem is defining what it is. They do think it is a 
necessary sacrifice to get the mission or job done. It is the price of freedom. Therefore, 
they did not think it was a huge problem that needed solving. One Marine stated, “Is there 
a problem?” Another Marine stated the importance of definition in general: 
I think everybody is saying a lot of great things. I think the definition of 
conserving energy is important to be laid out to begin with because if you 
plug your computer into a solar panel and you think, Oh, I am conserving 
energy. [Really,] you are using the same amount of energy, you are just 
getting it from a different place. So I think not using the computer is as 
much the answer and I think that sort of mindset is what needs to be 
pushed down. I think you are asking how does that happen, but I think it 
partly should be rolled up maybe in part of that training or what have you, 
exactly what that means. I think right now when everybody thinks 
conserve energy, they think like I am driving my Prius, which maybe is 
conserving energy, I don’t know, but like you are using solar panels or 
something like that. You are trying to sell it to a bunch of people like 
Lance Corporals who go out and buy big F250s and stuff. 
The enlisted Marines did not mention defining energy-efficient 
technologies as a problem. They also did not know about the existence of the E2O, 
GREENS, or SPACES. This data may suggest that not enough information is available 
about these topics readily accessible to them to have the opportunity to be confusing. 
Overall, however, the data suggest that the problem that energy-efficient technologies 
serve to solve is not clear or the same across Marines.  
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4. Perceived Image of Energy-efficiency Initiatives 
a. Officer 
The data suggest that the problem has to be important at each level and 
examples need to be set by leaders and especially the key leaders as described above and 
incentivize Marines to use energy-efficient technologies. The group felt that the battalion 
commanders and company commanders are key leaders to instill energy efficiency as a 
change to the end user’s perceived image of energy efficiency initiatives. A Marine 
commented: 
The other thing is in the commandant’s document—so I am not a genius 
here, I am just kind of regurgitating what I have learned, but he talks about 
weaving it into the doctrine. As doctrine changes, which it is going to 
because we are not doing too many amphibious landings these days and 
we probably won’t be, so as doctrine starts to change you have to weave it 
in there. We train how we fight, that is everybody that is already in knows 
that, right, so over time I think it is going to be doctrinally acceptable. It is 
going to take a while. Everything as far as the existing Marines as far as 
getting them to get the buy in and everything all these gents already said I 
agree with. The other thing is at the commander level, at the top down you 
have to have a reporting metric to make people care, which they do. There 
is actually an expeditionary office in all the MARFORs now and possibly 
every major MFC I think. It talks about—the guidance document also 
talks about it is going to become a [DRRS] reporting item (Defense 
Readiness Reporting System). Most officers know what that is, a lot of 
staff and COs know what that is because they have a reporting 
requirement to submit to that. That document is how commanders will be 
evaluated on their energy efficiency so they are going to care because it is 
going to affect them directly and that is how you—a way to gain buy in. 
The battalion commanders’ and company commanders’ roles play a 
distinct part in influencing what the operators, the Marines on the ground, think about a 
topic. They have the most direct link and will impact Marines the most. Furthermore, the 
Marines suggested that Marines should be targeted early on to stress the importance of 
energy conservation in general that would come in the form of instruction in boot camp 
and in the schools that follow boot camp. A Marine commented: 
Even at the recruit training level and OCS, the whole purpose—and 
TBS—the whole purpose of those schools is to make a Marine a basic 
rifleman and to make an officer a provisional [rifle] platoon commander. 
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So it would be expeditionary energy skills you learn there are going to be 
at the grunt, infantry, basic level. These are the basic things you need to 
know. Then once you go to your MOS school, whatever that is, you are 
going to have certain energy-efficient technologies that are specific to 
your MOS that you will learn. So it is kind of—it is a pipeline and it is 
going to be a process and it is going to take a long time. 
Another Marine added: 
I think there are two populations that need to be looked at. You have those 
that are already in the Marine Corps who already are operating with a 
specific mindset because that is the way they have come up and then you 
have those that are in recruit training, OCS, your brand new assimilating 
folks who are making the transformation. So they don’t know anything, so 
if you start it there, that is where you really plant the seed for this mindset. 
Then that will be easier, in my opinion, than the transition that has to be 
made with those already serving because they are already used to doing 
what they have always done that has been proven, that they are used to it.  
The Marine Corps would have to introduce energy conserving techniques 
and equipment in their specialty schools. The data show that strong emphasis must be 
placed on energy efficiency to demonstrate it is not a fad in the Marine Corps, but a way 
of life.   
When the focus group was asked, “what would be an effective way to 
reach Marines and communicate the importance of energy-efficient technologies?” They 
agreed that less resources supplied to accomplish the same mission would send a 
message. The message would be that this initiative of energy conservation is important 
and it is necessary to ascertain how to perform a job with using less, which would bolster 
and incentivize the use of energy-efficient technologies because no other alternative is 
available. Granted, it would not be easy and it would not be across the board for all 
missions and programs. However, if the Marine Corps picked appropriate areas to 





I think from the top down the way you communicate—like I said if you 
have say I am just going to throw fictitious numbers out there. If you have 
a company of Marines that uses 100 gallons of fuel a day and you want to 
cut that metric in half you say, alright, I want it to be cut in half. I only 
want you to use 50 gallons of fuel a day. If you still provide that company 
with 100 gallons of fuel a day, they are going to use it. 
Three other Marines passionately added the following comments: 
The only way you know is to cut their budget. 
Again, the problem with—I think what they are doing, that is very high 
numbers. That is like literally taking all the Marines in country and look at 
all the fuel that is used for jets, generators, vehicles, everything. So you 
can put that number so you can’t really go to a unit and say per se half 
because of who controls what. This guy—yes, I think it needs to be 
translated into actionable items. Like any messages or any strategic 
guidance, you can’t take that and give it to the tactical level as is and 
expect them to understand what to do. They have got to translate that 
message down so it gets down to that level and it is actionable. They know 
that means to me is hey, look—and that is what you have got to—it has to 
be translated into that look, we are going to reduce electricity. No lights on 
after such an hour unless you are up doing operations. No—generators 
will be turned off at this, showers will be reduced to reduce hot water 
usage. Those kind of things that the Marine can understand and that those 
NCOs can force them to do and that kind of stuff. 
So yes, exactly. So I mean turn off lights, make sure the water is not 
running whenever it shouldn’t be, taking [long] showers, doing the small 
things that are going to help you become more efficient before you start 
worrying about the technology. 
The Marines explain that if the end user’s resources are reduced, but they 
are expected to maintain the same effectiveness level, the end user will look for 
alternative methods to extend their supply.  
Marines then elaborated on the origins of their perceptions. The data also 
suggest that Marines have a negative view towards the energy efficiency initiatives 
because of its association with Congress. The intensity of the Congress comments was 
high (3) due to the emotion and consensus among the group. The “perceived image of 
energy-efficient initiatives” is that it cannot be taken seriously because of how closely 
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tied it is with Congress. Marines have a hard time taking Congress seriously and 
therefore cannot take the energy-efficient initiative seriously. As one Marine commented: 
I think it is comical that we try and use the word efficiency when we start 
thinking about Congress and the political system because at the end of the 
day it is the most inefficient system. So we have these great notions of 
what we want to do and like forgetting about energy for a minute and let’s 
talking about fiscal responsibility. The military is a horrible example of 
fiscal responsibility. We are the most irresponsibly organized group 
because of the way Congress sets it up. If you don’t spend it, you don’t get 
it next year. Like there is no; ‘hey, let’s plan to set this money aside.’ It is 
like you said, feast or famine. When you got it you better spend it because 
it is not going to be there. I am not even going to go down that road 
because we all know it. But that is what I am saying like when we think 
about outside the Marine Corps and we talk about being efficient and 
responsible, ball it up and throw it out the window because it honestly has 
no play. It is just a complete joke to even [take it seriously]. 
Another Marine added to that: 
And that is one of those pillars that should support the easy adaptation of 
being energy-efficient. So if we are not fiscally efficient, then why the hell 
are we going to be energy-efficient? It is just another fad. 
This statement suggests that Marines view the problem of fossil fuels as 
one of limited real consequence and the need for energy efficiency as a short-term, knee 
jerk reaction to a tight budget rather than to a long-term serious problem. They cannot 
take it seriously because of how Congress acts as a whole in other areas of spending. It 
was surprising how much Marines seem to take the actions of Congress into account. On 
the other side, a different Marine saw the problem as a perceived image but from another 
standpoint. This Marine argued that the Marine Corps is taking on energy-efficient 
initiatives because they want to look good in the eyes of Congress: 
The reason we are doing it though is that we want to be energy-efficient—
why? Because it makes us look good to Congress and they say hey, they 
even have less money—so I think it ties into it because right now the 
Marine Corps is under scrutiny again because by the way, like I agree with 
what you said. If we were just going to be a 15 day sustainable force, but 
man tell me the last time you went and sat at a MEU somewhere for 15 
days and then a large army came in and took over? Like unfortunately we 
have strayed so far from our amphibious doctrine that is just not what we 
are fighting. Congress and the Marine Corps [together] looked at the 
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Marine Corps and said, “Holy mother of God how much money have you 
guys spent in Afghanistan?” Because set up these frou frou cupcake camps 
and we have all these things there. Now we have to look at it and be like, 
man—. 
The data suggest that energy-efficient initiatives conflict with long held 
values and traditions. Those values and traditions are operating as an expeditionary force 
with a high amount of mobility. The data suggest they do not like traveling with all their 
existing equipment to a stationary base in theater as it is. The fielding of more equipment 
to test and use is pushing them farther away from being mobile.  
b. Enlisted 
The enlisted Marines comments suggested a high concern over the 
perceived image of energy efficiency initiatives. The following comment set the tone of 
the conversation displaying dissatisfaction with the Department of Defense’s (DoD) push 
for energy-efficient technologies. The Marine stated: 
We are, as a military, whether it’s the Army, Marine Corps, the Navy, Air 
Force, some of the biggest wasters in the entire world. More so than any 
other organization, any other place that I can really think of. I mean, even 
in Third World countries they find a can laying on the side of the road, 
they take it home so they can use it as a pot. You know, we create those 
cans, so to speak. 
This comment demonstrates that enlisted Marines feel that an ulterior 
motive exists in integrating energy-efficient technology in the military. Other Marines 
stated that to change this negative perception, all levels must show genuine care of 
energy efficiency. Some enlisted Marines strongly felt the benefits of energy-efficient 
technologies with the following comments: 
It’s just makes sense to not have to rely on anybody else. If we’re self-
sufficient, we’re not relying on anyone else to do it for us. We’re doing it 
ourselves and with our organization it’s important that we remain self-
sufficient and not needing the community. 
This comment suggests that some participants felt Marines have lost their 
expeditionary roots and implies that some energy-efficient initiatives are tied to non-
expeditionary strategies, which would suggest that Marines think solutions that bring 
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them farther away from being expeditionary is a waste of time. Other Marines stated that 
using energy-efficient technologies could yield monetary benefits. Seven comments 
focused on their units running out of money or not having sufficient funds for training. 
The data suggest that the enlisted Marines felt that energy-efficient technology may save 
money and increase funds available to their unit. 
Everything’s just cost-efficient if we do it that way. It, it, it stays away 
from the fact that we start dipping into this whole sequestration with, you 
know, messing with career Marines’ retirement, you know, Marines going 
to college, you know, for the Tuition Assistance Program that got pulled 
and then it goes back again, you know, it’s all about money. So everything 
that we can do I…the way I look at it, everything you do to save money, 
everything that’s cost-efficient can help benefit all of us, all around the 
military. 
Based on the data, the problem appears to be that DoD has a negative 
public image. A Marine added that the benefits of energy-efficient technologies might 
improve the DoD’s public image. The comment suggests that energy-efficient 
technologies can demonstrate an image of financial responsibility.  
To expand on that a little bit, if you’re not costing as much and there’s the 
potential there to have surplus energy that you can then sell back to, like, 
the general populace, like citizens? Then, that does something to the 
military in general’s, like, people’s perception of it, like, people will look 
more favorably, I feel like, on the military and on the Department of 
Defense if there is that kind of like, community interaction, uh, between 
the energy surplus and then selling it back to the community or selling it 
to, like, other organizations. Does that make sense? 
Another Marine added, “And it’s gonna make us look better, just in 
general as an entire society of Marines.” 
It was found that enlisted Marines feel that the Marine Corps has a 
wasteful image. This comment implies that energy efficiency cannot be taken seriously 
when undertaken by an organization that consistently consumes high amounts of fossil 
fuels to accomplish its mission. The data suggest that to the extent that Marines perceive 
that fossil fuel dependency is a problem, it is one of perceptions. Marines suggested that 
fossil fuel use might indicate a lack of fiscal responsibility and long-term planning.  
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5. Perception of the Solution 
The final driver of this framework addresses the Marine’s “perception of the 
solution.” The “perception of the solution” demonstrates an end user’s potential plan to 
solve an existing issue. Based on the data collected, it was found that a Marine’s 
“perception of the solution” is constructed from a “perception of the problem.” The 
“perception of the solution” driver contains three key themes: cost, traditions and norms, 
and product effectiveness. 
a. Cost 
(1) Officers. The key theme, cost, does not have a sub-
category; however, definitions of cost are varied. Cost type comments were mentioned 15 
times between both NPS focus groups. The intensity was ranked as high (3) due to the 
emotion attached to each comment and the follow-on discussion. The data suggest that 
some Marines view that the implementation of energy-efficient technologies involves 
different forms of cost. For example, one Marine focused on the monetary aspect with his 
comment:  
I would say once the CO started looking at his budget and it got cut when 
[we had continuing] resolutions it was like, hey how can we save money? 
Oh, fuel costs us how much? Okay we are going to cut that. It wasn’t 
necessarily looking at conserving energy, it was because fuel costs X 
amount of money out of his budget. So at the tactical level it is how do we 
reduce the amount of fuel that we are using to save money so that we can 
do these other things? 
On the other hand, they were more concerned with money and 
time. For example, one Marine stated:  
Time, you know. How much more time am I going to have to commit to 
perform the task? How much more budget? What am I going to have to 
sacrifice in my budget in order to accommodate this and how do you 
balance out that long term/short term type aspect? 
In addition, another Marine added: 
I was going to say with the cost, I mean it is also the money that goes into 
it, but the time and the effort it takes to maintain it and move it and also 
the reliability because if that thing goes down, do we have to have two or 
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three systems instead of just one system in case that system goes down, so 
we actually have to buy three of them for every one generator we use 
now? What is it actually going to cost to keep our operations going? 
The data suggest that Marine officers are thinking about many 
variations of cost and that they are also very forward thinking because they discussed the 
need for multiple backup systems of energy-efficient technologies. The Marine above is 
suggesting that not only would they bring multiple energy-efficient technologies to serve 
one purpose but they would also be bringing the non-energy-efficient technology because 
it is tried and tested and units would want something they know works while testing the 
new equipment. That issue raises many negative aspects about their perception of the 
solution. The data suggest that Marines perceived energy-efficient technologies as very 
complex and costly. 
(2) Enlisted. The key theme, cost, was also a prevalent factor 
across both enlisted focus groups. It had a frequency of seven times and the intensity was 
high (3) due to emotion and follow-on discussion. The data suggest that enlisted Marines 
thought energy-efficient technology initiatives are being brought about because the 
existing solutions are expensive and that a lack of funds occurs within the USMC. As one 
Marine commented: 
I agree with you, Gunny, and that’s another thing that comes back on the 
Marines, they tell us all the time, “we’re running out of money, we’re 
running out of money, we’re running out of money” and so we’ll have to 
go out and buy our own batteries from a store because one, like he said, 
half the time they won’t even work so, I mean, we can talk about saving 
money all day long but it’ll come down to the Marine anyway because 
we’ll spend our own money just to make sure it works. 
These comments suggest that enlisted Marines think a funding 
shortfall exists due to how costly their existing fossil fuel dependent equipment is. When 
asked the question, “Who has heard about units running out of money?” they responded 
with: 
You hear it all the time. 
Oh yeah. 
I’ve heard rumors of first IR being ninety grand in the hole. 
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I’ve heard a rumor that my unit is one hundred ninety grand in the hole. 
I got word about a month ago that First Marine Division was $1.5 million 
in the hole, alright? So it’s across the Marine Corps, it’s just the budget 
they give us, the money’s out there, it’s just the budget that they give you. 
Another Marine gave a specific example of what is costly about 
the current solutions. The conversation steered towards traditional power sources, such as 
batteries. The data suggest that some Marines think non-rechargeable batteries are too 
expensive, “It’s not only just buying the batteries; it’s when we get rid of them too.” 
Additionally, another Marine elaborated on costs associated with 
traditional batteries: 
It takes a large chunk out of the training budget. I specifically work in 
HazMat [Hazardous Materials] and each barrel [of used] batteries [is 
weighed.] And obviously all the batteries in a fifty-five gallon drum are 
heavy so it usually costs us about $800 per barrel to get rid of, so that’s 
where the re-chargeable batteries come in. 
These last two comments suggest that enlisted Marines view 
traditional batteries as expensive, and for this reason, think energy-efficient solutions 
have increased importance. It is a little surprising to learn how often funding is talked 
about from superiors down to the enlisted Marines, which may suggest that leaders want 
their soldiers to understand they cannot do certain things because of a lack of money. 
Some comments suggest that the problem is having money for other important programs. 
If that is the case, then this suggests that spending money on energy-efficient 
technologies will not free up money for other important programs but actually create 
more of a problem.  
b. Traditions and Norms 
(1) Officers. The key theme, traditions and norms, as similar to 
Kleijnen, Lee, and Wetzel’s (2009) definition, is interpreted as: “inherited body of 
customs and beliefs within a relevant social context” (p. 348). Kleijnen, Lee, and Wetzel 
(2009) also state that traditions and norms “suggest that culture and society create so-
called diffusion thresholds, when innovations go beyond this threshold they will be 
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resisted” (p. 348). This concept is relevant to this study because the Marine Corps have 
deep roots in their culture and will most likely effect adoption. Traditions and norms 
contain the sub-categories ethos and perceived image of energy efficiency initiatives. 
Ethos was mentioned five times and its intensity is a moderate (2) based on moderate 
frequency but it still evoked follow-on discussion. Perceived image was mentioned three 
times and its intensity is a moderate (2) due to the emotion and head nods it produced. 
Traditions and norms are associated with the “ethos,” which is a commonly used term to 
describe the culture within the Marine Corps. The data suggest that Marines think the 
culture must be changed from within for energy efficiency to occur overall. One Marine 
commented on how a typical way of life consumes a lot of energy and how the non-
essential equipment should be reduced: 
Not allowing everybody to have a [TV]. We joke about it, but it is 
amazing how much power is actually taken when people start hooking up 
TVs and coffee pots and all the other little things that get hooked up in a 
COC type area and you start taking away some computers and things like 
that. You walk into some places and they have three or four computers per 
station all of them drawing that four watts every hour or so. 
This comment suggests that the Marine culture enables or approves of people using 
multiple monitors when they could get by with one. It also suggests many areas could be 
targeted for reduction in consuming energy (TVs, coffee pots, etc.). The next comment 
illustrates the resistant view some Marines have taken towards energy-efficient solutions, 
which is embedded in their culture: “I want to repeat what participant 2 said, just cut 
down on fuel? So if you told me to cut down on my fuel, I would tell you to go 
[expletive] yourself.” This emotional comment suggests that Marines who perceive 
change as challenging may negatively impact the execution of their mission. This 
resistance is a natural reaction because they would prefer to use tested technologies that 
have worked in the past. 
Another component of ethos in the Marine Corps is the fact that 
Marines need to be successful at their mission. The data suggest that Marines understand 
what works and what does not work for their mission. One Marine commented that they 
spend the money to provide every Marine a certain piece of gear for insurance purposes: 
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I have one example and it talks about what another participant was saying 
is that we had a package come in for individual man pack bridges and the 
justification statement was solid. They had a no kidding beef for these 
things, but I mean when you talk about efficiency, it is really not efficient 
for each individual to have a man pack bridge to cross [a river]. Maybe a 
company bridge or something like that, but—so when you talk about 
efficiencies, it is really counter to that. Now everybody has got a man pack 
bridge, just a bridge that he carries on his backpack—but the justification 
came through and you know it was no kidding these things were possibly 
going to save lives. It goes to what someone else was saying is that when 
it comes down to it, sometimes it is a cost of doing business is that we are 
just going to be inefficient because we need to. Because we as a nation put 
a premium on human life and not only human life, sometimes human 
comforts for [Marines] and things like that. 
This comment implies that Marines think it is better to be safe and outfit everyone with a 
piece of gear that might save their lives. The comment illustrates that not only does the 
Marine Corps put a premium on safety, but the country does as well, which suggests that 
some think that the Marine Corps can afford to be energy inefficient to possibly save 
lives.  
The discussion following these comments shifted towards possible 
solutions to combat the negative perceptions. This next comment illustrates that training 
and educating a new Marine recruit about energy-efficient technologies and behavior is 
not enough. It suggests that once new Marines enter the fleet, Marines with more time in 
(who are resistant) will instruct new Marines that the energy-efficient way is not how the 
mission is completed, but rather, the traditional way of doing business: 
I have a question for that. So you train the recruits, in Officer Candidate 
School (OCS) or the incoming [enlisted] Marines on how to train them on 
the system that you want them to use. When they get to the unit, there are 
people that are already used to a certain method, who will change [the new 
Marine’s] training and revert back to the traditional system. 
You see it all the time, you always hear there is the way you learn how to 
do things and the way it is really done. But if you do that at OCS and [boot 
camp] and you give these impressionable minds and say okay, this is the 
way things work, this is the way you want to go with it. But when they get 
to the fleet, that has to be the way it is done also because if not, then they 
are just going to say, well okay—they are just going to [do what the older 
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Marines tell them to], they are impressionable minds and they will say, 
Okay, I know I learned it this way, but this is the way it is really done. 
The data suggest that the training will be wasted because the 
traditions and norms are so strong that the older Marine will override that new training 
and energy-efficient methodology. Therefore, it is important not only to train new 
Marines but the current force as well to change the mindset. As one Marine commented: 
Well that is why it is [so important to be] part of the process because part 
of it is everyone in the fleet, Marines, you got to do this, develop the 
metrics, hold folks accountable. At the same time, it takes time to train 
new folks and that becomes instilled coming through the training pipeline 
to change the behavior. So you have got to do it at both points, the initial 
entry and the current folks. It takes time because yes, once you have 
embedded cultural mindset it is not going to happen right away, Marines 
will get there and some guys won’t want to do it. They will learn to go 
back to bad habits, if you will. But over time it is culture, it is behavioral. 
(2) Enlisted. The data suggest the enlisted Marines also had 
strong views on the ethos within the Marine Corps. Many comments suggest they think 
the services waste money: 
We are, as a military, whether it’s the Army, Marine Corps, the Navy, Air 
Force, some of the biggest wasters in the entire world. More so than any 
other organization, any other place that I can really think of. I mean, even 
in Third World countries they find a can laying on the side of the road, 
they take it home so they can use it as a pot. You know, we create those 
cans, so to speak. 
Another Marine added: 
It’s ridiculous, the amount of money that we spend on Porta-Johns is, like, 
$4,000 per month, per Porta-John, yes, it’s ridiculous. 
Similarly, a Marine gave an example of how the Marine Corps or 
any service should be run like a business. The Marine’s comment suggests that the 
Marine Corps is not forward looking in terms of revenues and resource allocation: 
It’s ridiculous. I mean, we could make more efficient waste management, I 
don’t know exactly how good our facilities are. I’ve done training on some 
of them, just because I do HazMat, but, I mean, there are ways and 
obviously in the beginning it’s gonna cost a lot more, it’s gonna cost a lot 
of money up front to do that and with sequestration, that is not gonna be 
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an easy thing to push. But if we’re looking, which I haven’t seen since 
I’ve been in, that people look that far out, but if you’re looking 20 years 
down the line, okay, in 20 years, are we gonna be making money or are we 
gonna be wasting money? Where is that [analysis]? In the beginning we’re 
gonna spend a lot of money, say it takes—say today you decide, We’re 
gonna do X Project.” Okay, at what point in time does the X Project start 
giving us what we want? I think that is the point. If I can do it within 10 
years, okay, they say we’re gonna go in Afghanistan, we’re gonna be there 
for X period of time, now we’re getting out. Okay, it will be the same 
thing. It’s like any other business. Okay, so I open a grocery store, I know 
that I need to put this amount of money down. I need to pay for all of these 
different costs. At what point do I start making money? If the Marine 
Corps, or any military in general, starts thinking in terms of, How can I 
make my own money and support myself?” it would be a lot better off 
overall. 
A Marine then gave an example of a possible solution. This next 
comment suggests that enlisted Marines think certain things that create waste are the 
problem: 
I think, at that point, it comes down to minimizing waste. ‘Cause there’s a 
lot of crap that gets thrown away, that gets left behind, that gets wasted, 
that doesn’t get used, but we pay for it anyway. I feel like, in terms of, 
energy-efficiency a good place to start would be to look at reducing waste 
and ways to create things that we are using now that we need in a way that 
is less disposable, that doesn’t have a like…Like an MRE! You open an 
MRE and every single thing in the MRE has a wrapper. Do we really need 
that? Is there a way to change how we put those together, to make it not so 
wasteful so we’re not leaving trash when we pull out of a country? 
To add to that viewpoint, another Marine commented with: 
I know how expensive a generator is, and how much money it costs to put 
fuel in it, like the GETS trailers that the Communications and the COCs 
[Commander Operation Centers] use. They go through a 55-gallon drum 
of JP-8 a day each, and that’s if you’re not running the air conditioner. If 
we’re in the desert, we’re definitely running an air conditioner, so in a 
giant COC you’re using ten, that’s ten 55-gallon drums of fuel. Is there 
another way to get the energy that we need to be able to do that instead of 
using fuel? 
This last comment suggests that enlisted Marines are not aware of 
GREENS, but however, still think that a more cost efficient way to run mobile command 
posts should be available based on how much fuel they consume. It is surprising that 
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none of the enlisted Marines had heard of GREENS. The moderator of the focus group 
then asked, “What if I told you there’s a generator that runs off solar power. What would 
it take for you guys to adopt that?” They responded with: 
How much power does it give us? 
And how much is it going to cost the military? 
And how much is it going to cost to fix it? 
And how much is it going to cost to train the personnel to fix it when it 
breaks, and to create that MOS inside of the Marine Corps? Because there 
is not a Solar Panel Operator Technician MOS, so you would have to 
create an entire job, train everybody in it, and create the rank structure 
inside of that, that’s gonna be the hard part. Giving us solar panels or 
having us buy it, that part’s easy, it’s training people to fix them. 
The previous comments suggest that enlisted Marines are 
concerned with the characteristics and life-cycle costs associated with energy-efficient 
technologies. The data suggest that they are aware of the training and re-structuring that 
must accompany a new solution. The comments also suggest they are aware the solution 
is complex. On the other hand, however, the conversation concerning culture and ethos 
ended with this next comment: 
Say we’re on deployment and you don’t really have electricity, you can’t 
really plug anything in, you just got to your little PB [Patrol Base] and you 
grab that SPACES, solar kind of thing, plug it in and you’ve got music for 
the next couple days, whatever, like that’s the only type of stuff we use it 
for. We burn our trash, we do everything else, we’re not very energy-
saving-efficient people. 
This last comment suggests that even if units were given energy-
efficient technologies that behavior would still have to change in other areas for the 
Marine Corps to truly be energy-efficient. This last comment suggests doubt exists about 
changing the USMC’s culture to be more energy-efficient even when given the 
technology.  
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c. Product Effectiveness 
The key theme, product effectiveness, incorporates five sub-categories: 
durability, compatibility, complexity, reliability, and integration. Overall, the frequency 
of these sub-categories was a seven with a heavy focus on reliability. The intensity is a 
high (3) due to the follow-on discussion and agreement through agreeable body language. 
The data suggest when an innovation is introduced to the Marine Corps; a Marine gauges 
the product effectiveness by the product’s longevity in a combat environment, the ease of 
use, the ability of the product to integrate with existing equipment, and if the product 
does what it claims to do. 
(1) Officers. One Marine participate stated that a GREEN 
technology system at his company level was successful in Afghanistan. The system was 
rigged to work properly but the generator would kick in when maximum capacity was 
reached. This hybrid set up worked well and the transition into the new technology was 
understandable and easy to rely on because it had a dependable back up in case the new 
technology failed.  
Yes we saw the same thing in Afghanistan. I saw one successful use of the 
GREEN system and it was at a company level because that was small 
enough that the GREENS could power a COC, a company sized COC in 
the direct sunlight and they had a generator backup. So it was jury-rigged 
to work properly where they would use solar panels up until it couldn’t 
and then the generator would kick on. But anything below that they didn’t 
have the training to actually employ it and anything greater than that they 
had too much of a power draw that it didn’t really do anything for them 
except get in the way and break. So you know the threshold of where 
energy efficiency goes, to what tactical level, what stage of the fight is 
definitely going to be a factor? I would not want to cross the beach with a 
GREEN system. 
The type and size of unit also determine whether energy-efficient 
technologies are appropriate and successful. One Marine stated:  
Depends on—like they were saying though, it depends on what level of 
command you are at and what your unit actually does, whether it is 
worthwhile or not. But we used more passive [systems] like the solar 
shades to cool our generators and keep our tents cool, which actually 
saved us a lot of fuel. 
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The size and type of unit also tied into compatibility and 
integration: 
I have used the SPACES and GREENS systems. We had a limited amount 
fielded to my battalion. Some of the companies had it, but they didn’t have 
it companywide. They had a couple of platoons with it here or a couple of 
COPs there. It was pretty good stuff, but the problem is when they took it 
down to the individual piece of say a radio trying to have some sort of 
solar rechargeable, solar operated—solar powered radio, but the problem 
was they weren’t compatible with all the different types of radio systems. I 
mean even the radios that we have out there today, every battery—most 
people think that you know that these things called a 5590, they think that 
battery can power everything, but it is just not true. So it becomes for us, 
for me as a communications officer in a ground combat element, it was an 
issue of compatibility and availability. 
This data suggest that not all equipment can be powered by the 
same energy-efficient technology. Therefore, the perception of the solution is that the 
equipment creates a compatibility/integration problem because it does not work on all 
gear. Compatibility and integration also extends to operating in different countries, which 
the data also suggests is a concern: 
Can I use my energy-efficient technology based on resources available in 
host nation or do I have to have a certain type of whatever to be able to 
make it work? If that is limiting us with the specific thing that you need, 
you know we go to austere places that host nation support is not always 
going to have some high tech thing. 
Moreover, integrating energy efficiency not only into certain sizes 
of units and types of environments creates an issue but integrating it into types of gear 
seems to create doubt among Marines. One Marine from the aviation community 
commented: 
Impossible, yes. Making the actual aircraft more efficient. You know fuel 
is a source of energy, so how are we going to get an F18 from consuming 




The data suggest that Marines doubt the characteristics of energy-
efficient technologies. They think they are less reliable and less durable: “Possibly less 
durable, possibly less reliable than standard technologies.” Furthermore, the data suggest 
that Marines think environmental conditions affect the reliability of a solar powered 
system: 
Yes, but the thing about the GREENS is like we made a lot of solutions 
for Afghanistan and that is one of them. Hey, look. It is sunshine 365 days 
out of the year. We are not always going to be there. We are going to be in 
locations that we might have to find other renewable sources than just 
solar panels. If we do use dirigibles, why can’t we put a wind turbine in it? 
So that gives you something. You know we use boats, if we are on a 
coastal region; you have got wave generators that you can use. Riverine 
you can do riverine generators. We just don’t have a lot of [flexibility]. 
We can go out and get a lot of different technologies to go and do it for 
specific areas, we just don’t know where the next fight is going to be and 
until we can figure that out, you know, we are going to probably end up 
choosing a solution that doesn’t match the next fight, which is like—. 
Similarly, another Marine commented on the reliability, “Since it 
is a new technology there could be kinks in it, so reliability may be an issue.” An 
addition, a Marine responded with: “Doesn’t work as good as the [standard] battery.” In 
addition, another Marine commented on the durability of energy-efficient technologies: 
“More fragile, so if you use it out there and it gets banged around it is more susceptible to 
damage.” All these comments suggest that Marines perceive energy-efficient 
technologies as a problem in itself due their unreliable and fragile characteristics.  
Another important characteristic is simplicity. The data suggest 
that a new energy-efficient technology will face resistance if it is too complex, which also 
suggests that the amount of time to learn how to operate it should be minimal: 
I would say a big stressor on that would be simplicity. Like there are 
technologies in the civilian sector where we can hold out a little thing and 
charge your cell phone, plug it in, it is pretty simple. It is a plug and play 
technology. When you need to have a special MOS just to fix it, I think we 
have lost sight of the mission when we are talking expeditionary. Because 
if a basic infantry private can’t figure out how to plug that thing in and use 
the energy, we are kind of doing something wrong. 
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The Marines also included the amount of training involved with 
new technology in simplicity. Their comments suggested that the new technology should 
not require a huge amount of training for the sake of simplicity and to reduce cost: “Who 
trains those Marines now to fix that gear? Who trains those Marines on how to operate 
that gear?” In addition, another Marine commented on the importance of simplicity. His 
comment suggests that if energy-efficient technologies are not kept simple, a host of 
other problems are faced: 
My point is that we have high demand/low density MOS that are 
specifically to the energy portion. There is not a lot of electricians out 
there and that is part of what the issue is going to come down to is, do we 
have the personnel there who can actually troubleshoot these types of 
systems? So we are going to have more money and more training, but on 
top of that everybody is going to have to have some sort of energy 
efficiency technology. So now do we increase boot camps? 
This comment suggests that Marines are in tune to other issues that arise with a complex 
system to include the timing and cost of training, and possibly, a new MOS solely to 
work on the special equipment. In addition, the availability of the new personnel to work 
on degraded equipment in the field is a factor.  
Their perceptions of the solution seem to suggest that in some 
circumstances, Marines will adopt a new technology only if the system is linked to 
trustworthy pre-existing equipment that is easy to use. Additionally, the learning curve of 
a new technology must be limited especially in a combat environment. The training 
required must be minimal and seamless to the end user. In the case of the successful 
GREEN technology, it was adopted because Marines could easily rig the new technology 
to a generator providing confidence in the new system. If the perception of the new 
technology was complex, it might have been pushed to the side. 
The perception of energy-efficient technology in many 
circumstances would suggest that Marines in these focus groups tend to think that the 
current technology is effective, which demonstrates that Marines attitudes toward new 
energy-efficient technology are unnecessary and the cost of adopting it is not worth the 
risk. While some new energy-efficient system itself requires less direct fossil fuel 
 76 
dependency, in some circumstances, it does require more indirect logistical support. 
During the discussion, an example was given; the use of solar panels required two 
additional trucks as compared to the existing technology that required one truck.  
On the other end of the spectrum, a success story for high rate of 
effectiveness is the M2C2 as mentioned above in the opinion makers section. One 
command post vehicle incorporating the same functionality as 40 trucks resulted in a high 
rate of effectiveness. The Marines who had experience with the M2C2 were highly 
impressed. Examples like the M2C2 provide Marines the confidence to adopt new 
technologies given the tangible value in the new system.  
(2) Enlisted. Comments from the enlisted focus groups relating 
to product effectiveness were mentioned five times with high intensity (3). A heavy focus 
was placed on compatibility and reliability. The data suggest that the enlisted Marines 
have a very strong desire to see that it works and helps complete the mission. The 
Marines brought up rechargeable batteries and how saving money was beneficial but then 
another Marine mentioned the lack of effectiveness of the energy-efficient technology:  
The only problem with rechargeable batteries or energy-efficient stuff is if 
we use those energy-saving resources, whatever you want to call it, those 
batteries die quicker than a battery that you got out of a package and put in 
and when it’s done, it’s done, you throw it away. 
Then, another Marine added to that comment and explained how 
he would rather spend the extra money on something reliable, which suggests that 
enlisted Marines view the benefits of having batteries or equipment they can trust as 
outweighing the higher costs of non-energy-efficient solutions: 
Those rechargeable ones, yeah, you recharge them but all of a sudden after 
the tenth recharge they don’t work anymore. So, yeah, I mean, we’re 
spending money on the batteries that do work but, I mean, I’d rather have 
those in a combat situation than have a battery I think was charged, then 
all of a sudden I go out and it doesn’t work. So, I mean, you can look at it 
both ways, yeah, we’re spending more money, but in the end, I mean, 
they’re better in a sense, I would say, than having them only work for ten 
times and then they lose charge… 
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The conversation also steered towards examples of other 
compatibility issues with different types of equipment. One such example was a vest that 
holds ammunition magazines and other small pieces of gear. The data suggest that 
Marines would rather use something that works better than the issued gear: 
Like we get those stupid LBV’s [Load Bearing Vests] issued in the 
government, you know, and the chest rigs are just more efficient, you have 
all your magazines up front, things like that where it just makes more 
sense than what, than the stuff we get issued to us. 
The comments also suggest that the enlisted Marines are concerned 
about the durability and integration. They mention that fixing a new piece of gear is 
logistically complex, as well as transporting it. They mention that location determines 
how complex it is to fix something. This data suggest that if equipment cannot be fixed 
and transported easily, Marines will resist adoption: 
And then they get [expletive deleted] broken, you know, or if somebody 
sends us parts to fix this… most Marines can figure that out on their own, 
but then when you go to fix [solar panels] or run [solar panels], put some 
550 cord on this to make it work, whatever, it all depends on your 
situation and stuff. In the States, turning on the RAMP and stuff like that, 
yeah, solar panels are great, just put them all over all kinds of stuff, I’m a 
big believer in it but it all depends on where you’re going with what 
you’re doing, can you actually use that or carry it around in a pack or 
hump it around in a pack? If it’s going to be in the back of an Amtrac 
[amphibious tractor] is it going to get broken, damaged, what’s the 
turnaround for us getting parts for it? It all depends where you at.” 
Enlisted Marines are also aware that for solar panels to work, they 
need a proper amount of sunlight. This data suggest that they are aware that the 
geographic location will impact the effectiveness of energy-efficient technologies, such 
as solar panels: 
And it would have to be a viable concept to be able to say, “Hey, by the 
way, we’ve used this in said places where there is a lot of other things 
going on. Whether we’re [operating in different] weather conditions, 
okay? If I’m in a place like Great Britain, solar power is probably shitty 
‘cause it rains, what, every other day there? 
The Marines shared the view that the solution is complicated and 
expensive; complicated because changing an ethos and a way of life is not easy. Marines 
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have been operating with non-energy-efficient technologies for years. They think it will 
be expensive because they understand that new technologies require research, 
development, and testing. Many auxiliary costs, on top of the primary cost just to build a 
new system, occur also that include modifications, training, and maintenance.  
6. Marine Suggestion on Implementation 
The Marines argued that the Marine Corps must conduct an in depth cost benefit 
analysis to illustrate the tangible benefits of integrating new energy-efficient technologies 
over the legacy equipment. Marines actually need to see that it is a viable option that 
makes sense for them to use it. Most Marines in this study think that energy-efficient 
technologies are very expensive and will not sustain the level of operations demanded. It 
is not surprising that Marine officers are weighing costs and benefits, but it is surprising 
how in depth they analyze cost. In the Marines’ eyes, high costs and low operational 
effectiveness decrease the possibility of adoption. For example, one Marine commented:  
So I think the installation side and [combat deployments] fall into 
[different categories], but I start seeing a lot of the solar panels going up 
around the different bases which I thought was interesting because I 
always wondered, what does it cost having those solar panels and [what 
are] their [life] expectancies versus what we pay if we are just paying the 
electric bill to [a] county or what have you? Because you don’t ever see 
the connection. Yes, it may be more efficient, but are we [really saving 
money]? Did somebody do that cost/benefit analysis?  
In addition, another Marine stated that energy-efficient technologies are not cost 
effective. “There is a reason we don’t have everything run by solar panels right now, 
because it isn’t cost effective.” Then, another Marine emphasized that energy-efficient 
technologies must be evaluated from a mission accomplishment standpoint, as well as a 
cost-benefit analysis:  
You have got two things [here]. You have obviously got mission 
effectiveness, we have got to accomplish the mission where it is unlike a 
for profit company looking just like at a [CBA] to say okay, is it more 
profitable? Well it doesn’t matter if we reduce costs, [and] make money, if 
we are not accomplishing the mission. So it is like the two prong 
[approach], if we can still accomplish everything we need to accomplish 
the mission, yet then I think the other part is doing like a [CBA]. Okay, 
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well it is going to cost initially this much to put this type of gear in, but we 
are saving this much on usage, which means okay, we can have less 
refueling convoys which costs that and then if there are lives saved, you 
can attribute a life from operating in a hostile environment then you value 
that life and all that. Then you have got the [CBA]. So then the key is 
obviously can you make that to where you are saving money and still 
accomplishing the mission? 
Another implementation strategy is proof of concept, which is described as an end 
user’s trust in the equipment. A Marine’s trust is a function of how the implementation of 
energy-efficient technologies is viewed in a realistic environment. Proof of concept 
combines the sub-categories from product effectiveness (durability, compatibility, 
complexity, reliability, and integration) into one single notion that the energy-efficient 
technology will accomplish the mission and increase the feeling of safety. For example, 
one marine commented:  
No, people just want something that—they don’t want cool stuff. If it 
makes them feel like it is going to help them survive, that is the biggest 
thing.” 
This new energy-efficient technology will have functionality at the same level or 
better than the existing product. as a result of an end user predisposition to use the 
product effectiveness of the existing product as a baseline. Participants commented: 
The key initially I think is going to be that this is got to be like a 
supplemental. You have got a proof of concept. Say like the MTVR, 
(medium tactical vehicle replacement) the sides become solar panels. They 
simply run that to an outlet where you can like plug into for other things 
and you can power, so again it becomes a power source. If it breaks, we 
don’t have that power, so it doesn’t affect the running of the vehicle. See 
what I am saying? 
This comment had high intensity level (3) because it generated a unanimous 
agreement throughout all the participants of the second focus group. It resulted in the 
following remark: 
Yes, our battery technology is really—it is limited. The expectation is 
commercial level coms, commercial level C2, commercial level vehicle. 
Why even cars, I can get a car that can go 100 miles, yet I have got a truck 
that goes a mile on a gallon of gas. A lot of stuff we are using in the 
military, though it is ruggedized, though it is weighted and protected and 
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all of that other stuff, there is still an expectation that we can do that in the 
military. So we come here to a school like this and it is like okay, how do 
we figure out how to make that happen? But you know—. 
Some missions also happen too quickly to set up the solar panels or other similar 
energy conserving equipment. Therefore, not only is it mission specific, but set-up time is 
a factor, and the Marines must be trained on the equipment to understand its capabilities, 
and built trust in the equipment. For example, one Marine stated: 
I think the actual coordination was done at regiment. Once we were going 
to get the actual gear and everything. Then they came down to the 
battalion level and trained us on it. It was a classroom setting, it was in the 
field training right outside. Not going to the field, just right outside in the 
parking lot in the grass, you know training there. Then so once we got the 
buy in, we knew how it was used, we could tell the Marines and work with 
the Marines. But then once we were done with that, they focused on the 
Marines, the actual operators of it for the majority of the time. It was 
implanted like that, worked with them and then it was conducted to a live 
fire field exercise. So very—you know the Marine Corps always says; 
crawl, walk, run. That is how it was done and that is how I believe this 
training right here needs to be done because there needs to be buy in at 
every level. 
This comment suggests that opinion makers and the end user must train on the 
equipment in a non-hostile environment to develop trust that it will work in a combat 
situation. The term “crawl, walk, run” illustrates that training must be at a slow and 
graduation process. Once training is completed, it can then be employed in a combat 
environment. For example, a Marine stated the following about a product used in a 
combat situation: 
Depends on—like they were saying though, it depends on what level of 
command you are at and what your unit actually does, whether it is 
worthwhile or not. But we used more passive like the solar shades to cool 
our generators and keep our tents cool, which actually saved us a lot of 
fuel. 
The data demonstrates that Marines understand that some drawbacks are 
associated with energy-efficient technologies; however, if the benefits of the technology 
exceed the drawbacks in a combat situation, Marines have a high probability of adopting 
the technology. 
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Yes, two things I saw. Both kind of abstract, but one was we employed a 
thing called the M2C2. It was a mobile command post, we will just call it 
that. But the thing that was nice about it is it had all my coms and 
everything built into it and C2 facilities so they could take one truck and 
they could drive that one truck, though putting all your eggs in one basket 
was kind of dangerous. That one truck could do the same as an entire 
regimental CP of 40 trucks. So one versus 40 when you start to look at the 
footprint of that log train, to me that is not necessarily having a more 
efficient truck that can get more miles per gallon, it probably got less, but 
because you are reducing all those—the log train that is supporting the 
COC because you have consolidated, it kind of is energy-efficient and we 
are going to that technology with the [NODM] I think is what they are 
calling it now. [NODM] is kind of like the next generation of stuff that the 
Marine Corps is going to. So that is one way to look at it is, hey maybe we 
put some of our money towards these packages because I know the MRQ-
12 van for aviation guys and [MRQ-13], those are the same kind of things 
we could focus that energy-efficient technology by reducing the log train 
and supply train behind it.  
On the other hand, if the product does not perform during a mission, it will lose 
the Marine’s trust, which translates into a failed proof of concept, and the Marine will not 
adopt the system. For example: 
If you have it as integrated on it, but not to where it won’t function. So if it 
doesn’t work, the unit still functions whether it is the generator, [MTVR], 
Humvee, new joint fighting vehicle—whatever—it is made that way, it 
provides and it can run. It is almost like think of a hybrid vehicle. It can 
run on hybrid and then if you run out of battery power you can just 
[inaudible] you have got fuel or the thing would be if it breaks it doesn’t 
down the whole system. Now that your solar power is down you can’t 
operate the system then you have a serious point of failure. It has got to be 
separable in that way. If it breaks, that is fine, let’s just go running, I get 
back to the rear, out of the operation of deployment and then it can be 
fixed and looked at. 
The Marines believed that two main advantages occur. They perceive that energy-
efficient tools and technologies are less dependent on fossil fuels and serve as an alternate 
source of energy. They also believe various disadvantages occur as well to include 
complexity, which boils down to increased setup time, how to use it, different logistics, 
and weather dependent. They also perceive it to be expensive and fragile.  
 82 
The enlisted Marines comments highly focused on the proof of concept. The data 
suggest that the enlisted Marine would have a high probability of adopting energy-
efficient technologies if it is proven that the product works. The proof of concept had a 
frequency of 24 comments with high intensity and passion. It was found that both groups 
of enlisted Marines were not aware of the existing energy-efficient technologies 
available. It was explained to the groups that GREENS and SPACES are currently being 
used in selected units, and asked, “so now that I told you that there is equipment available 
for that, what would it take for you guys to start using it?” Their comments were: 
Test it, test it. 
Let me see if I can break it. 
Other comments that followed were: 
Let us borrow it for a couple of Field Ops, let’s see how it does out there. 
Because this way you [find] the most problems, when the [equipment] 
breaks down and you want to actually test it out, you can get it tested out, 
you can get it tested out all over, just have them check sitting on the 
RAMP and then just it out there is not going to do anything. So, it’s kind 
of [messed up], we check her out and fill it out for about month out in 2-9 
and see how it holds up. 
They showed interest in energy-efficient technologies; however, based on their 
comments, they displayed a high level of skepticism of the equipment actually 
performing better and lasting longer than the current equipment. If the product does 
work, the Marines showed high enthusiasm in adopting it. More specifically, the enlisted 
Marines were concerned with the product effectiveness in a combat environment. One 
Marine stated: 
Generator solar panel, whatever you want, I mean, that generator, go put it 
in a desert environment ten weeks, run it constantly, non-stop without it 
dying for seven months, like, the solar panel, like you’re saying, if it 
breaks because, as Marines, when we’re getting in and out of vehicles, we 
grab stuff, we pull stuff, do this and the other thing, it’s going to get 
caught on stuff. If that thing’s durable as can be and it costs $400, by all 




gets caught on something, the cord rips out, like am I going to buy it? Is it 
that durable? Probably not, like it has to be able to withstand Marines and 
that’s just what it comes down to. 
An enlisted Marine commented regarding an aftermarket armor plate carrier he 
used with: 
It’s not going to happen, everyone’s going to pretty much, like they said, 
they’re probably going to go out and buy their own stuff like that, but 
that’s for comfort, that’s not for looks, that’s so they can move around. 
He stated with high enthusiasm, if a product works better than what he was 
issued, he is willing to purchase it with his own money. Another Marine agreed and 
added: 
Yeah, that’s what everybody wants, it’s comfortable, put it how you want 
it, it’s easy. 
The next section talks more about the specifics of an energy-efficient technology 
in the form of a performance measure. Thirty percent of the Marines stated that  “buy in” 
must occur or definitive motivation to adopt and use energy-efficient technologies. The 
participants explain that to change the Marine “ethos,” the Marine Corps can stress the 
critical nature of energy conservation. One Marine stated: 
If you tie energy efficiency to an evaluation metric, it is going to make 
people care. If they don’t, then they are going to be gone. It is the same 
way with physical fitness tests (PFT), rifle ranges, professional military 
education (PME); they are all marks that are on there for a reason, because 
it is important to the Marine Corps. A Battalion Commander may not care 
about energy efficiency, but when there becomes a metric for measuring 
energy the Regimental Commander can see across his three battalions who 
are using the most fossil fuels. The result will be somebody getting 
negative marks, causing wide discussion which will trickle down 
throughout all the USMC ranks. 
The comment above illustrates the need to create a way to measure energy 
efficiency to reflect the opinion makers and the end user’s performance evaluation, which 
is also supported by the following statement: 
Well every level of command has their buy in and has to take that message 
and push it down. What point if somebody doesn’t care, if it is a 
regimental commander and it gets down to him and just it is not a priority 
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with him, he doesn’t push it down to the battalion commander, doesn’t get 
pushed down to company and you get a whole regiment that it just doesn’t 
become a priority. It is like anything else, the leadership has got to be 
involved. Then you have got to be genuine and have some level of buy in 
too. Marines are pretty good about doing what they are told and that is 
how you usually get people to care, is to buy in. Because if that company 
commander is now buying in, that battalion commander is not really 
enforcing it, then he is not going to care from there on down people aren’t 
going to care. You have got to do it all the way down. You have got to get 
that actionable [item].  
These responses advocate an incorporation of a metric that captures and evaluates 
leaders’ effectiveness in conserving energy. Those units and leaders in charge of those 
units would be commended for their use of energy-efficient technologies vice traditional 
fossil fuel dependent equipment. The comment above demonstrates lower fuel 
consumption would illustrate their use of the energy-efficient technology and increase 
their chances for awards, promotion, and retention. Adding a measurable component to 
energy efficiency and holding Marines accountable would signify a paradigm shift in the 
Marine Corps.  
Surprisingly, it was found that Marines did not place much emphasis on the 
attractive appearance of a product, but rather, they focused on the functionality. Marines 
feel that if it will accomplish the mission and reduce the risk to lives, they will establish 
trust in the equipment. If this proof of concept exists, then they will have a high 
probability of adopting the technology. 
Overall, the Marines suggest a cost benefit analysis, a proof of concept, and a 
performance measure to prove the validity and importance of energy-efficient 
technologies, which suggests that Marines need to see the concrete value that a certain 
technologies will provide them. Additionally, Marines understand the importance of cost 
and want to see if the benefits of energy-efficient technologies outweigh their risks.  
C. FOCUS GROUP COMPARISON 
1.  Focus Group with Officers 
The first two focus groups were conducted at NPS. The demographics (depicted 
in Chapter III) between the two groups of Marine officers were nearly identical. In the 
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first focus group, the officers were an average age of 32.6 years old, averaged 0.89 
deployments within the last four years, and had an average of 12.55 years of service in 
the Marine Corps. In the second focus group, their average age was 33.3 years old with 
0.92 deployments and 12.33 years of service. While not much variance in the 
deployments and years of services occurred, the first group consisted of nine males, and 
the second group had 10 males and two females. Also, another difference between the 
two Marine officer focus groups was the type of MOS. The first group consisted of 45% 
combat support officers (logistics and supply), 33% finance officers (comptrollers) and 
22% combat arms officers (mp and artillery). The second group consisted of 42% combat 
support officers (logistics, supply, and adjutant), 33% technical combat support 
(communications and air command and control), and 25% pilots (fixed and rotary). In 
both focus groups, the majority of the officers were combat support officers. However, 
the second focus group differed from the first group because it contained two females, 
officers with a technical background, and pilots. The second focus group did not have any 
officers with a financial management background (the first group had three officers).  
Despite the differences of gender and MOSs between the two focus groups 
conducted at NPS, the same narrative was used to conduct the focus group (Appendix A). 
During the coding and analysis of the transcriptions, few differences were found between 
their responses. It was concluded that differences in gender and MOS did not change the 
high-level drivers for captains and majors in the Marine Corps.  
2.  Focus Group with Enlisted Marines 
The third and fourth focus groups were conducted at Camp Pendleton with a total 
of 25 enlisted Marines. The third group consisted of Marines with an average age of 26.6 
years old, averaged 1.42 deployments within the last four years, and had an average of 
7.25 years of service in the Marine Corps. However, the fourth focus group had an 
average age of 27.3 years old, 1.08 deployments, and 7.77 years of service. Although the 




average of .52 less years of service than the fourth focus group and the third group had an 
average of .34 deployments in the last four years, which is likely explained through the 
differences of MOS between the Marines.  
The third focus group’s MOS were comprised of the following: 67% vehicle 
operators and mechanics, and 33% combat arms (rifleman). This group of Marines was 
comprised of 12 males and zero females. During this focus group, the number of their 
comments that referenced opinion makers, communications, perception of the problem, 
and the perception of the solution were 11, 23, 20, and 33 (listed respectively). It was 
found that the majority of their comments focused on the Perception of the Solution, with 
54% (13/33) of the comments focused on proof of concept. It was also determined that 
the majority of their comments were related to proof of concept, and consisted of the 
following: 
Show me that it works. 
If you were to show me that it worked on everything that we do and 
everything that we use, of course I’ll buy it. 
We found that the Marines in focus group three were not aware that 
energy-efficient technologies currently existed in the Marine inventory. 
We explained that there was equipment such as GREENS and SPACES, 
and we asked, “So now that I told you that there is equipment available for 
that, what would it take for you guys to start using it? 
Their responses were: 
Marine 1: Test it, test it. 
Marine 2: Let me see if I can break it. 
The fourth focus group consisted of 54% combat support, 23% logistical support, 
and 23% technical combat support. This group had six females and seven males. During 
this focus group, the number of their comments that referenced opinion makers, 
communications, perception of the problem, and the perception of the solution were 12, 
20, 12, and 17 (listed respectively). It was found that in this focus group, the majority of 
their comments focused on the communications driver. They commented with the 
following: 
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Female Marine 1: Facebook. Ahh, Twitter. LinkedIn. YouTube. Google. 
Female Marine 2: [The USMC should] link your names, any changes that 
happen. Like, Hey, this is brought to you by, you know, E2O… 
Surprisingly, the fourth focus group was the only group that mentioned leveraging 
social media is an effective way to influence Marines to adopt energy-efficient 
technologies. It was concluded that a difference might exist between enlisted Marines 
with different occupational specialties and/or gender. Combat arms Marines focused on 
the testing and product effectiveness of technology and service support Marines were 
more willing to adopt a technology based off what they heard from their chain of 
command, which implies that multiple methods of communication must be used to reach 
all the Marines.  
3.  Officer vs. Enlisted  
The focus groups between officer and enlisted Marines demonstrated many key 
similarities, but many key differences as well. It was found that the frequency of the 
high-level drivers was similar for both officer and enlisted. Both the officer and enlisted 
Marines’ frequency of high-level driver related comments ranked as follows (highest to 
lowest): perception of the solution, communications, perception of the problem, and 
opinion maker, which leads to the belief that Marines, regardless of rank, have a high 
willingness to develop a solution to accomplish a mission, and are less influenced by an 
opinion maker. However, it was demonstrated that the officers had a higher percentage 
comments focused on the perception of the solution and the enlisted had a higher 




















Officer Totals 35 42 36 93 206 
Officer 
Percentages 16.99% 20.39% 17.48% 45.15% 100.00% 
  
Enlisted Totals 23 43 32 50 148 
Enlisted 
Percentages 15.54% 29.05% 21.62% 33.78% 100.00% 
Table 1.   Focus Group High Level Driver Comparison 
According to the data, both officers and enlisted Marines addressed concerns of 
budgetary issues affecting the Marine Corps down to their level. However, the officers 
were more concerned with financial consequences to the U.S Marine Corps at a strategic 
level, and the enlisted Marines focused at lower level, such as their units’ ability to train. 
Also found was that none of the enlisted Marines were aware of the existence of E2O, 
GREENS, SPACES, or any other energy-efficient technologies used in the Marine Corps. 
In contrast, the majority of the officers did, which suggests that the energy-efficient 
initiatives are not being communicated down to the end user’s level.  
The data also suggest that the opinion makers for both enlisted and officers were 
similar. They both view that the most influential people/positions are the battalion 
commander, company commander, and gunnery sergeant. They used the term “our chain 
of command” to describe these positions as a group and as individuals.  
D.  SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter analyzed the data collected from both NPS and Camp Pendleton 
across different ranks and MOS backgrounds. Based on the frequency and intensity of 
responses, the data and analysis emphasizes several areas to understand what drives a 
Marine’s acceptance or non-acceptance of energy-efficient technologies. Also, the 
original framework indicated that the perception of the problem and perception of the 
solution were separate drivers that influenced the end user independently as shown in 
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Figure 8.  Research Influence Campaign (after Watkins, 2003) 
The initial framework was created based on Watkins’ Influence Campaign. The 
original framework depicted that the opinion makers did not have a direct link to the end 
users. However, opinion makers indirectly influenced the end users by leveraging 
communications methods, which was demonstrated a linear process of opinion makers 
through communications method that influenced the end user. As mentioned above, three 
top communication channels were used, but word of mouth seemed to be the dominant 
channel among officers and enlisted Marines, which implies that implementation 
strategies to facilitate Marine-to-Marine communication would increase the likelihood of 
adoption. The officers were more exposed to the E2O’s initiatives, but the enlisted 
personnel seemed to have never heard of the E2O, which suggests that the existence of 
the E2O is not being communicated to lower levels of the Marine Corps. A common 
theme among officers and enlisted Marines is the fact that a lack of definition exists 
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regarding energy efficiency, which suggests that as understanding the initiatives 
increases, adoption will increase as well. During the analysis, some variations were 
discovered that lead to the modification of the framework. The next chapter presents 
recommendations by taking the findings and new framework into account. 
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V.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This study was designed to identify the drivers that lead Marines to adopt energy-
efficient technology. In this research, four focus groups were conducted. The first two 
focus groups were conducted at NPS that consisted of company and field grade officers 
(Captains And Majors). The third and fourth focus groups were conducted at Camp 
Pendleton and comprised enlisted personnel from E–3 to E–7. Drawing on the initial 
framework developed from the academic literature, high-level drivers were focused upon: 
opinion makers; communication methods, perception of the problem, and perception of 
the solution. First, based on the findings, this chapter provides recommendations on how 
the Marine Corps can leverage high-level drivers (as identified) to increase the 
probability of Marines adopting energy-efficient technologies. The chapter then provides 
limitations of the research and recommendations for further research, and concludes with 
overall benefits of the study.  
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings from the focus groups, numerous concepts materialized that 
should help answer the primary and secondary questions. The following section offers 
three suggestions to help the E2O understand the drivers associated with successful 
adoption, and identify areas upon which the E2O may want to focus. None of the 
following recommendations is mutually exclusive, but applying them independently, in 
totality, or in some combination, may lead to further acceptance of energy-efficient 
technologies.  
1. Opinion Maker 
Based on the analysis and findings, the E2O should focus its energy-efficient 
initiatives toward the battalion commanders, company commanders, and platoon 
sergeants in deployed units, units returning from deployment, and units scheduled to 
deploy. The focus groups identified the battalion commanders, company commanders, 
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and platoon sergeants as the most influential leadership positions/individuals to the end 
user. The researchers recommend a special focus on deployed, returning from 
deployment, and scheduled to deploy units into a combat zone because they have the 
most to benefit by leveraging energy-efficient technologies. Additionally, energy-
efficient technology should be marketed as a USMC initiative. Linking these initiatives to 
organizations outside the Marine Corps can lead to resistance because Marines may 
perceive an existence of insincere/ulterior motives behind the push for energy-efficient 
technologies. The data showed that Marines do not trust outside influencers.  
2. Communication Channels 
The data suggest that the most effective communication method to increase the 
adoption of energy-efficient technologies is through word of mouth. A key approach to 
develop a positive message through word of mouth is by leveraging communication 
through peers by recommending the following: creating a Marines-only technology 
exposition, a more aggressive testing/fielding program, and a basic marketing campaign 
at the battalion level.  
This analysis showed that Marines prefer to see equipment in use and talk to 
people who used the equipment, which suggests an exposition containing only Marines 
(no vendors or outside organizations/individuals) displaying current energy-efficient 
technologies may increase the likelihood of adoption. Such an exposition could enable 
Marines to observe demonstrations, share experiences using these products, and increase 
awareness about current tactical and strategic solutions involving energy-efficient 
technologies. The academic literature (Rogers, 1995) emphasizes that having a hands-on 
experience with the technology while talking to people who have experience using it 
increases the rate of adoption. The data suggest that Marines currently do not have the 
opportunity to experience energy-efficient technologies and discuss the equipment’s 
advantages and disadvantages with an actual user. As a result, an exposition could 
provide word of mouth communication opportunities to Marines and adoption may 
increase if these opportunities were present.  
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An aggressive program that fields energy-efficient technologies to units for 
testing would be an extension of the Marine-only exposition. This analysis suggests that 
only a limited number of units obtain the opportunity to test equipment. None of the 
participants in these focus groups had hands-on experience with GREENS or SPACES, 
and only 4% of the Marines in the focus groups knew of a unit that was part of a test 
group, which implies that trialability is limited. Trialability is likely to increase the 
adoption of technologies (Rogers, 1995; Darley & Beniger, 1981). In other words, an 
aggressive fielding and testing program could improve the acceptance of energy-efficient 
technologies by making them more trialable.  
The data from the enlisted focus groups suggested that lower level Marines did 
not know the E2O existed and were not aware of specific efforts or technologies. Based 
on Rogers (1995), information must be shared to reach a mutual understanding. Thus, 
information gap needs to be fixed. It is recommended that “all hands” meetings during a 
battalion’s formations be conducted. The battalion commander should lead such events to 
create awareness of the E2O, its purpose, and most importantly, initiatives. The goal of 
increasing energy efficiency and specific tools and technologies to do so could also be re-
enforced with flyers posted around base.  
The importance of word of mouth is suggested by this analysis. For example, the 
4% of respondents who learned of GREENS technology through word of mouth from 
their peers had positive comments on the GREENS generator. However, only 4% had 
heard of GREENS through word of mouth, which suggests that the Marine Corps should 
develop a more robust strategy in communicating energy efficiency’s existence and 
importance. As one Marine stated, “If it works, maybe I’ll tell people…” 
Another Marine followed up with, “I would probably continue using it, I would 
tell other Marines about it, share it, have them use it. Tell them where they can get it.” 
As indicated in the previous chapter in which Marines suggested implementation 
strategies, they stated that hands-on experiences with actual operators would create the 
trialability opportunities that would also lead to word of mouth. The aforementioned 
recommendations will create communication methods to spread information about 
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energy-efficient technologies and the products available for use to expand the existing 
Marine network that relays trustworthy information. In turn, more word of mouth 
communication will occur. A Marine-only exposition can spread word of mouth 
communication and increase the likelihood of adoption. 
3. Managing Perceptions 
Perceptions of the problem and solution are reciprocal processes. Their perception 
of a problem affects a person’s perception of appropriate solutions (Bijker, 1997; Kaplan 
& Tripsas, 2008), which further suggests a focus on two efforts: 1) identification of a 
definition of a consistent problem, which is consistent with the solution of energy 
efficiency, and 2) specific measures to influence Marines’ perceptions of the problem.  
To influence perceptions of the solution (technologies), a first step for the E2O 
should be to identify a frame for the problem of fossil fuel dependence consistent with 
the solution of energy efficiency. This analysis shows that Marines are confused as to 
what the Marine Corps is trying to accomplish through integration of energy-efficient 
technologies into their way of life and hold varying perceptions of the source and 
legitimacy of the problem posed by fossil fuel dependence.  
For example, this analysis shows that Marines are concerned with fiscal efficiency 
and that a negative perception of energy-efficient initiatives directly tied to funding issues 
exists: 
I think it is comical that we try and use the word efficiency when we start 
thinking about Congress and the political system because at the end of the 
day it is the most inefficient system. So we have these great notions of 
what we want to do and like forget about energy for a minute and let’s talk 
about fiscal responsibility. The military is a horrible example of fiscal 
responsibility. We are the most irresponsibly organized group because of 
the way Congress sets it up. If you don’t spend it, you don’t get it next 
year. Like there is no; hey, let’s plan to set this money aside. It is like you 
said, feast or famine. 
This comment suggests that Marines think the driver of the effort to increase 
energy efficiency and the problem of fossil fuel dependence is the need to reduce cost. 
This perception is at odds with the message portrayed in E2O statements. This perception 
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seems likely to hinder adoption. The analysis shows why this mismatch is a problem. 
When Marines define the problem of dependence on fossil fuels as one of cost, the fact 
that energy-efficient technologies may be expensive decreases the legitimacy of the E2O 
objective as shown in this comment:  
It takes a large chunk out of the training budget. I specifically work in 
HazMat [Hazardous Materials] and each barrel [of used] batteries [is 
weighed.] And obviously all the batteries in a fifty-five gallon drum are 
heavy so it usually costs us about $800 per barrel to get rid of, so that’s 
where the re-chargeable batteries come in.  
This analysis suggests that perceptions of the problem are influenced largely by 
the definition of energy efficiency and perceived image. Thus, the E2O should work to 
ensure that leaders demonstrate to lower-ranking Marines that energy efficiency is a top 
priority. Leaders at all levels must be consistent in their energy conservation behavior. 
Chain of command related comments were mentioned for 32 pages of transcription out of 
161 pages, which is 20 percent. Marines in the focus groups shared the view that leaders 
with inconsistent energy conserving behavior would hinder the adoption of energy-
efficient technologies, which is evident in the quote from the last chapter referencing the 
allowed use of multiple computer screens and unnecessary equipment that consume high 
amounts of electricity. 
Leadership and behavior should be consistent to demonstrate that energy-efficient 
technologies are a top priority in the Marine Corps. For example, a Marine coming out of 
boot camp may be taught that energy-efficient technologies are important to the Marine 
Corps; however, once a Marine gets to the unit, the platoon sergeant may instruct the 
Marine to revert to past habits. Thus, the E2O’s message must be translated and 
consistent at all levels in the Marine Corps.  
Another suggestion of implementing energy efficiency is through limiting 
resources by providing units less fossil fuels. The Marines in the focus groups indicated 
that they would attempt to use 100% of what they are given because the government 
budget system is structured as a “get what you use” program. Many Marines in the focus 
group suggested that being given fewer resources would force them to use what is 
available, and figure out a way to complete the mission. The researchers recommend that 
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the Marine Corps incrementally limit resources given to units, which will force the use of 
energy-efficient technologies. This suggestion by the Marines does come as a surprise 
because it seems that it would only frustrate a soldier trying to complete the mission. It 
also seems somewhat blunt. The Marines’ suggestions, however, indicate that a strategy 
must be forceful, such as limiting resources for it to be effective. If the Marine Corps 
limits the use of fossil fuel technologies, this order must be enforced at all times and 
through all levels. The data leads to the belief that if the Marines’ behavioral patterns 
were changed, they would have a higher probability of adopting energy-efficient 
technologies.  
C.  LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research conducted focus groups from various specialties but located within 
the same geographical location (California) where the responses may have been 
influenced by an analogous environment in which the focus groups were conducted. 
Also, a small sample size (46 total) of both Marine Corps officer and enlisted participants 
was the basis and foundation of this research. The limited amount of participants may not 
be sufficient to understand clearly what drives a Marine to accept and adopt energy-
efficient technologies. One hundred percent of the Marine Corps officers were in an 
educational environment, which might not be relevant in a combat centric topic. The 
enlisted focus groups were unable to be broken up by rank; therefore, participants 
consisted of mixed ranks from lance corporal (E–3) to staff sergeant (E–7). Focus groups 
consisting of senior enlisted personnel may have provided further insight. The study 
participants only included active duty personnel, and the results may be different for 
reserve Marines. 
D.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Additional focus groups exploring what drives Marines to accept and adopt 
energy-efficient technologies may be useful. Segregating ranks (a group of just E4–E5, 
then a group of E6s, and a group of E7–E9) rather than lumping all enlisted personnel 
together may provide more useful feedback because Marines tend to answer more 
candidly in an atmosphere of like ranks. Branching out to Marines from a variety of 
 97 
geographical locations and units may provide additional insight the Marine Corps can use 
rather than limiting it to one coast. Future research could help identify what drives a 
Marine to adopt energy-efficient technologies and focus groups comprised of specific 
(MOS) could possibly provide greater understanding throughout the Marine Corps. 
Further studies could also incorporate the participation of reserve personnel, who may 
possess different opinions than active duty personnel.  
E.  BENEFITS OF THIS STUDY 
This study examined and sought answers to understand what drives a Marine to 
adopt energy-efficient technologies. Identifying the opinion makers and communication 
channels that have influenced Marines’ perceptions in the past provide potential 
explanations to help the Marine Corps change its ethos to foster energy-efficient 
initiatives. The research findings may offer the Marine Corps a clearer understanding of 
what the high-level drivers are and provide a means of going forward to facilitate the 
“buy-in” of energy-efficient technologies for Marines. 
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APPENDIX A. FOCUS GROUP ROADMAP 
Activity #1: Brainstorm, facilitators will list responses on white board to further 
discussion. This activity is to generate conversation and gain data to understand 
perceptions of energy-efficient technologies and the problems posed by dependence on 
traditional fuels (D & E). 
1. Leading Question #1: What comes to mind when you hear the phrase 
“energy-efficient technology?”  
a. Probing Questions: 
i. In general, what do energy-efficient technologies replace? 
ii. In general, what are some of the benefits of using these 
technologies? 
iii. In general, what are some of the drawbacks? 
iv. What about specific to the Marines?  
v. What could be benefits of energy-efficient technologies?  
vi. What are some potential drawbacks? 
 
2. Transition: Thank you. Now we would like to change tracks slightly… 
Activity #2: Brainstorm, researchers will list responses on white board to further 
discussion. This activity is to generate discussion and gain data to identify influencers of 
adoption of new tools and technologies (in general, B & C). 
1. Leading Question #2: What specialty items did you use while deployed 
that were not issued to you? 
a. Probing Questions: 
i. How did you hear about it? 
ii. What was most influential in your decision to use it? 
iii. What are the pros or cons? 
iv. How did you come to the decision to use it? 
 
2. Leading Question #3: What specialty items did you hear about and 
decide not to use? 
a. Probing Questions: 
i. How did you hear about it? 
ii. What were the pros or cons? 
iii. Why did you decide not to use it? 
iv. How did you come to the decision not to use it? 
Activity #3: Pictures or prototypes of technologies may be shown to draw the 
conversation back to tools specific to the Marines and gain data to identify influencers of 
adoption of new tools and technologies (specific to energy efficiency B & C). 
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1. Leading Question #4: What are tools/techniques Marines have used to 
conserve energy? 
a. Probing Questions: 
i. How did you hear about it? 
ii. What are the pros or cons? 
iii. What would cause you to most want to use it? 
iv. What would cause you to be concerned about using it? 
 
2. Leading Question #5: What are your recommendations? 
a. Probing Questions: 
i. What would help you to increase expeditionary energy 
efficiency? 





APPENDIX B. DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 
Please answer the following questions. Thank you. 
 
 
Are you male or female? 
 
 
What is your age? 
 
 
What is your rank? 
 
 
What is your highest level of education (please circle highest attained)? 
• High School 
• Some college 
• Associates degree 
• Bachelor’s degree 
• Trade certification 
• Master’s degree 
• Doctorate degree 
 
How many deployments have you completed within the past 4 years? 
 
 
How many years of service do you have? 
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APPENDIX C. DEFINITIONS 
*These definitions come from the researchers’ review of the literature and refined 
through data analysis. 
 
After Action Report (AAR)—formal documentation used by the Marine that critiques a 
mission. 
Accountability (ACC)—inventory management of equipment for which a Marine has 
signed. 
Advertisement and Reviews (ADV/REV)—non-formal information available to the 
Marine to include billboards, commercial, or prints sponsored by the manufacturer of the 
product that also contains reviews written by users of the product. 
Chain of Command (CoC)—personnel who have direct authority to the end users’ 
decision. 
Congress (CONG)—political officials other than the President of the United States. 
Complexity (COM)—the level of knowledge and training required to operate the 
equipment properly. 
Cost (Cost)—the end user sacrifices or monetary concerns by adopting a new 
technology. 
Definition (DEF)—the end user perceives as the term “energy-efficient technology.” 
Decision Maker (DM)—the end user. 
Durability (DUR)—the product’s ability to perform as expected for a long period of time 
in a combat environment. 
Ethos (ETHOS)—common term to describe the traditions, norms, and culture within the 
USMC. 
Performance Evaluation (EVAL)—an official who assess a Marine’s performance, and 
includes a rating system. 
Marine Expo (EXPO)—an annual exposition co-sponsored by the Marine Corps yearly 
in three different locations (Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, and Quantico) that 
demonstrates the latest technology, equipment, and systems available to the Marine 
Corps. 
Formal Communications (FC)—official methods of communications in the Marine 
Corps that have specific transmission channels. 
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Formal Guidance (FG)—written directives and AARs, and verbal orders passed down 
the chain of command. 
Flexibility (FLEX)—a product’s ability to adapt to other systems, as known as 
compatibility. 
Limiting Resources (LIM)—formal guidance to a subordinate unit to reduce assets 
and/or supplies. 
Newsletters (NEWS)—unclassified publications that a Marine can access. 
Observability (OBS)—a product that a Marine observed from another Marine or vendor 
and the ability to see the product’s effectiveness. 
Prior Experience (PE)—an end user’s personal experience. 
Peers (PEERS)—an end user’s friends, family, or another Marine within the same 
relative rank level. 
Perceived Image (PI)—a Marine’s opinion formed of a product or person. 
Proof of Concept (POC)—Product Effectiveness (Durability, Compatibility, 
Complexity, Reliability, and Integration) into one single notion that it will accomplish the 
mission and increase the feeling of safety. 
Preservation of Life (POL)—the product’s ability to save Marine’s life. 
Reliability (REL)—a system ability to perform and maintain its tasks in routine and 
hostile operations. 
Resistance (RES)—any action that exhibits opposition to adopting energy-efficient 
technology. 
Risk (RISK)—a level of sacrifice a Marine is willing to endure. 
RDT&E (RDT&E)—Research, development, testing, and evaluation involved in the 
prior to the production of product. 
Special Operations Forces (SOF)—personnel involved in elite direct action units 
Training (TRAIN)—formal process of educating a Marine. 




Video Games (VG)—interactive games played by Marines that include the Sony Play 
Station and the Microsoft Xbox 360. 
Word of Mouth (WOM)—informal method of verbal communication from one Marine 
to another. 
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